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Abstract
Decision makers face gains and losses decisions on an everyday basis. Unlike conventional
economic theories, the real decisions people make are influenced by various factors. Focality,
for example, is an important payoff-irrelevant factor that significantly influences individual
decision makings. In this thesis, we report three studies of decision makings influenced by
focality from a behavioural perspective.
In the second chapter, we extend the analysis of a riskless choice experiment reported
recently by Hochman et al. (2014). I run an experiment where participants select from
among sets of standard playing cards valued by a simple formula. In some sessions, par-
ticipants are given a prepayment associated with some of the cards, which need not be the
earnings-maximizing ones. Hochman et al. (2014) find that participants choose an earnings-
maximizing card less frequently when another card is prepaid. I find our experiment replicate
this result under the original instructions, but not with instructions which explain the pay-
ment process more explicitly. Participants who state they do not consider themselves good
at mathematics make earnings-maximizing choices much less frequently overall, but those
who express self-confidence in mathematics drive the treatment effect. Our results suggest
that even when comparisons among choices require only simple quantitative reasoning steps,
market designers and regulators may need to pay close attention to how the terms of offers
are expressed, explained, and implemented.
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In the third chapter, inspired by a historical event–“the treaty of Hong Canal”, I use ex-
perimental methods to test the effects of joint endowment on coordination success in tacit
bargaining games. It has been well established that people use existing focal points to fa-
cilitate coordination and the power of such cues declines as payoff becomes increasingly
unequal. I conduct an experiment in which two players jointly engaged in an interactive
team building activity and together earned the stakes over which they bargain. In the team
building exercise, two players jointly complete a shortest route task in a metaphor of a trea-
sure hunt. After the two treasure hunters complete the journey, they independently decide
how to divide their rewards using a tacit bargaining table. I find that when participants bar-
gain over the fruits that result from joint activity, they are more likely to coordinate the focal
point equilibrium. We contribute to the existing literature of team reasoning and focal point
by direct testing the influence of increased group identity on tacit bargaining games.
In the fourth chapter, I run an experiment of a dynamic real-time bargaining and report
the results. The experiment captures a situation where two players have the opportunity to
cooperate and share economic surplus in continuous time (peace), however at any point of
time, both players can turn the fruitful assets into battlefield at non-recoverable costs (wars).
The objective of the game is to capture players’ bargaining stances during dynamic interac-
tions and examine the influence of personal traits on bargaining outcomes. The results show
that majority of the participants exert costly efforts into “wars”, which results substantial ef-
ficiency loss. Focality has little influence on the efficiency attribute of bargaining outcomes;
however has significant influence on the distributive features of bargaining outcomes. More-
over, I find players who do not come into “wars” systematically use turn-taking strategies
to achieve relatively equal and efficient outcomes; And finally, females incur higher costs of
wars; pairs with opposite Locus of Control traits incur least costs of conflict.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In conventional economic theories, individuals make decisions based on stable utility max-
imizing preferences. However, the rising experimental evidences have demonstrated that
individuals can sometimes systematically deviate from economically optimal strategies; ex-
amples such as sunk cost fallacy (Thaler, 1999) and endowment effect (Thaler, 1980; Kahne-
man et al., 1990); and anchoring effect (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968; Johnson and Schkade,
1989; Furnham and Boo, 2011). While such behaviours are sometimes defined as decision-
making “anomalies” or “irrationality”, I want to have a closer look at these decisions for a
better understanding of “real” individual choices. Which is important for market designer
and regulators when they take into account of these anomalies before design, implement and
execute policies.
To examine individuals’ “real” decisions in economic environment and to what extent
do these decisions influenced by focality (salient focal point cues), we unfold the research
question in two dimensions: individual decision makings versus group interactions; static
versus dynamic (continuous) decision makings. Chapter 2 revisit an individual decision
making anomaly– the “prepayment effect” (Hochman et al., 2014). We find that the fram-
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ing of tasks, especially the saliency, can have significant influence on individual decisions.
In Chapter 3, we look at the role of salient focal point in static group-interactive decision
making environment. In this chapter, we use an interactive team building activity to induce
group identity in one treatment. And the results show that participants’ tendency to follow
salient focal point cues is also influenced by the feelings of group membership. Finally, in
Chapter 4, we extend the interaction between participants from static to dynamic. In an at-
tempt to examine the evolution of participants’ tendency to follow focal points. Our results
reveal that although various focal point cues can influence the dynamic interaction process,
but they have little influence on the payoffs. Interactions of individual characteristics, on the
other hand, have significant influence the results (payoffs) of the dynamic interactions.
In conventional economic theory, timing of payment should not have an influence on
individual’s choice of task, especially when time interval is no longer than 1 hour. In the
second chapter, we re-visited an individual decision making anomaly influenced by the tim-
ing of payment– the “prepayment effect” (Hochman et al., 2014). 1 Hochman et al. find that
when participants are given opportunity to choose from prepaid task and post-paid task with-
out any risk or uncertainty, there is a systematic tendency that participants choose prepaid
ones at sub-optimal situations. The experiment is designed as follows: participants are given
sets of four standard playing cards, and are instructed to select one card from each set. Each
card has a monetary value, which depends on the card’s suit and rank.2 In post-payment
1There is extensive literature on inter-temporal decision making anomalies (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992;
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Malhotra et al., 2002; Glimcher and Fehr, 2013; Morrison et al., 2016; Cohen
et al., 2016); however the game we examined cannot be counted as one of them, since the time-interval differ-
ence between prepayment and post-payment is as short as half an hour, moreover even the half an hour is not
free time to spend. In the game we examined, prepayment is more of a framing.
2The value of the card depends on its suit and rank only in distant representation framing treatments. In
other two framings, value of the card are given by specific number or a combination of both. For our study,
we only examined the distant representation treatment, because it is the only treatment that found to have
significant prepayment effect.
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treatment, participants are paid based on the cards they have selected in all sets. In prepay-
ment treatment treatment, participants receive an advance payment, which corresponds to all
spades cards in the sets. Each set has up to one spade card, in some of these sets spades
choices are optimal (earnings-maximizing), while in some of other sets spades choices are
not optimal. If participants choose spades cards, then they can keep the advance payment;
otherwise, if they choose other cards, they need to payback the value of spades in the sets but
they will be paid for what they have chosen instead. They find that participants in the pre-
payment treatment are more likely to carry-out the prepaid-choice (choosing spades cards)
than the post-payment treatment, even when the spades choices are not optimal choices.
One possible reason for participants’ preference for the prepaid cards is “loss aversion”.
Participants perceive potential losses higher than expected gains. Another possible reason,
we propose, is the saliency of spades cards in the task. Specifically, the spades cards differ
from other cards in three aspects, first in the protocol of prepayment: spades cards are pre-
paid; second in different in value of the suits: spades cards worth 25p per rank while other
cards worth 10p per rank; and third in the instructions the total value of spades are given but
not the other suits, which makes the spades cards even more salient than other suits cards. In
Chapter 2, we first attempt to examine the robustness of prepayment effect, conditional on
successful replication, we then unravel each possible explanations of the prepayment effect.
First, we replicate the “prepayment effect” in two treatments, the baseline treatment Post
and the prepayment treatment Pre+Amount. In addition, we conduct two additional treat-
ments Post+Amount and Pre+Amount+Instr to examine the influence of the choice envi-
ronment. In Post+Amount, we keep the essential features in the baseline treatment Post but
including the saliency of spades by mentioning the total value of spades cards in the instruc-
tions. In Pre+Amount+Instr we used the same experimental protocol with the prepayment
treatment Pre+Amount, but explaining the prepayment protocol in an alternative way by
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listing all possible scenarios explicitly. The purpose of Pre+Amount+Instr is to examine
the robustness of the prepayment effect in a different framing.
Our results shown that prepayment effect is robust in Hochman et al.’s original instruc-
tions in Post and Pre+Amount treatments. However, not in the alternate instructions treat-
ment Pre+Amount+Instr. Merely mentioning the total value of spades do not have signif-
icant influence overall, but strongly affects the non-native speakers to maximize less often
even in post-payment protocols. In addition, we find that participants’ maximizing behav-
ior is strongly affected by individual characteristics, which I will explain in more detail in
Chapter 2.
In Chapter 2, we showed that the saliency of spades cards can play an important role in
individuals’ preference of spades over other earning-maximizing cards. In Chapter 3, we
looked at the influence of salient focal point cues in tacit interactions.
In Chapter 3, we look at a type of coordination game– the tacit bargaining game. The
game is often used as a device to examine players’ cooperativeness in bargaining. The co-
ordination game is a type of game first introduced by Schelling, in which two players can
sometimes coordinate with each other without any communication by using salient focal
point cues in the game. In case of pure coordination games, both players in the game get
the same positive payoff if they successfully coordinate. In this circumstance, two players
have common interests. Focal point cue can serve as an equilibrium selection device. Tacit
bargaining games have the same feature as pure coordinate game, two players can coordinate
to get the economic surplus, however, there is a conflict of interest in who will get the larger
surplus. Schelling argued that in this circumstances, players should set aside the issue of
payoff asymmetry in the outcomes and focus on coordination. If focal point cue suggested
an unequal distribution, then the player who get lower payoff should accept it.
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Schelling’s intuition has been further developed into a family of theories of team reason-
ing (Hodgson, 1967; Sugden, 1993, 2000, 2005; Bacharach, 1995, 1997). In team reasoning
theories, players’ perception of salient labels and cues are included in the formal structure of
the game, as a result the equilibrium suggested by the focal point becomes dominant strategy.
In Bacharach’s theory, a player is said to conduct “team reasoning” if she works out the best
strategy profile for the team as a whole, and then carries out her component of it.
In existing experimental studies, it has been well-established that focal point cues can
be an effective tool to facilitate participants’ coordination in pure coordinate games (Mehta
et al., 1994; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997); and in tacit bargaining games (Bardsley et al.,
2010b; Isoni et al., 2013). However, as payoff allocations become increasing unequal, the
effectiveness of focal point cues will be decreased (see Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al.,
2014, for example).
In Chapter 3, we examined two candidate factors that could enhance participants’ team
reasoning so that participants are more willing to use focal point cues to coordinate, espe-
cially in asymmetric cases (conflict of interests). One factor is the induced group identity. It
has been well-established in social identity theories (Tajfel et al., 1971) that enhanced group
membership either by minimal group paradigm (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000; Chen and
Li, 2009) or though priming a common ethnic or community identity (Shih et al., 1999;
Benjamin et al., 2007; Attanasi et al., 2016) could increase players’ cooperativeness in so-
cial dilemma games. Another commonly used mechanism to enhance group membership in
operational research and also recently in experimental economics is through team-building
activities (Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2014). In Chapter 3, in order to induce
group identity without confounding the tacit coordination game, we use a interactive joint
activity (team-building activity) without face to face communication. The game we used is
based on the traveling salesman problem (TSP) and to our knowledge it is the first time this
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problem has been implemented in economic experiment.
The second factor is the origin of the potential economic surplus. In specific, whether
the opportunity to bargain over an economic surplus is jointly earned by the two players
or is given to them by default. Similar studies including the house money effect in indi-
vidual risk taking and cooperativeness preference (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Clark, 2002;
Weber and Zuchel, 2005) and the influence of endowment origins in bargaining environment
(Karago¨zog˘lu and Riedl, 2014).
We conducted 3 treatments in Chapter 3 to examine the two factors. And our main
result is that joint endowment (prior jointly activity and earn the opportunity to bargain) can
significantly increase participants tendency to coordinate using focal point in asymmetric
games; while merely joint activity has limited effects.
In Chapter 3, we look at the influence of focal point in a tacit bargaining environment
and the possible influence factors to enhance the effectiveness of focal point. In Chapter 4,
we further extend the bargaining environment into dynamic interactions.
In Chapter 4, we report results from a laboratory experiments on dynamic repeated bar-
gaining game in real time. The game design combines elements of tacit bargaining with focal
point cues (Isoni et al., 2013, 2014; Crawford et al., 2008; Bardsley et al., 2010a) and war
of attrition (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Bulow and Klemperer, 1997). In the game, play-
ers, as a pair, have the opportunity to share a continuous economic surplus; however both
players can start costly wars with regarding the possession of the assets. Costs of conflict in
possession come from two sources: 1. the forgone opportunity from not gaining from assets
in conflict; 2. The resources exerted in fighting.
Our game can be compared with war of attrition games (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986;
Bulow and Klemperer, 1997; Oprea et al., 2014) and other contests games (Nitzan, 1994;
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Phillips et al., 2010; Dechenaux et al., 2015; Sheremeta, 2013) in general, where players ex-
ert non-recoverable costs to ‘win’ the additional resources. Empirical evidences have shown
that people tend to over-spend in fighting which leads to inefficient outcomes (Chowdhury
et al., 2016; Cadsby et al., 2013); However our game has fundamental differences with ex-
isting games from several aspects: First, Most of the contest games are conducted in strictly
discrete time, while in our game every action is synchronized. This, we argue, can facilitate
players sending signals (without incurring costs) and when conflict happens, players can re-
solve more timely. Moreover, Unlike single prize auction or contests, our experiment has
9 independent assets to be bargained with at each period; which dramatically increased the
numbers of possible outcomes.
We analyze participants’ competitive behaviour in the experiment from 2 perspectives:
game structure and individual traits. We vary the structure of the bargaining table in two
dimensions: Imbalance and Central based on the spatial layout of the discs. The predictions
are based on existing theories and experimental evidences on focal point theories (Sugden,
1993, 2000, 1995; Bacharach, 1997, 2006; Mehta et al., 1994; Isoni et al., 2013). Our re-
sults show that costs of conflict do not significant differ across different game structures;
however, where the conflict arises, or the allocation of conflicts in the table, is found to be
significantly influenced by Imbalance and Central. Conflicts are more likely to happen in
Centraldistrict where focal point cues are absent; and when the allocation of discs is asym-
metric (Imbalance > 0), conflicts are more likely to happen in Zones that has more discs,
showing a preference for equity.
For personal traits, our results showed that pairs with opposite Locus of Control (Rotter,
1966) types incur lowest costs of conflict. Pairs with female participants incur higher costs
of conflict in general.
In addition to competitive behaviour, we found systematic cooperation in the experi-
7
ments. In specific, pairs who never incur costs during the time horizon of the experiment
have high probability to adopt turn-taking strategies to facilitate cooperation. This finding
is consistent with repeated coordinations games in the literature (Lau and Mui, 2008, 2012;
Silby et al., 2015; Cason et al., 2013).
Our findings in Chapter 4 can contribute to the repeated game literatures. Although there
are many experimental studies on repeated games in public goods game (Oprea et al., 2014),
prisons dilemma games (Bigoni et al., 2015) and battle of sex games (Silby et al., 2015; Lau
and Mui, 2008, 2012), most of the experiments are conducted in strictly discretely time. Our
game provides a device to capture real-time interactions between players and examine the
interaction effects of individual traits. In addition, our results can contribute the existing
studies of contests games. There are extensive literatures examining gender differences in
contests games (Eagly and Crowley, 1986), our results confirmed the competitiveness among
females in anonymous settings; moreover, our paper, to our best knowledge, is the first to
reveal the effects of LOC on competitive bargaining stances.
We believe there are much scope for future research. Although we found that opposite
LOC types have the most efficient bargaining outcomes, the underlying reasons are still not
clear. Moreover, as with most of the contests games, we find substantial efficiency losses
in bargaining outcomes. It showed that with real-time interactions, efficiency losses are still
difficult to prevent. It is worth exploring whether the results will remain robust if the real-
time interaction is undertake with mutually known identities.
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Chapter 2
Mathematics self-confidence and
prepayment effect in riskless choices
2.1 Introduction
A stylized fact of behavioural economics is that individuals dislike losses more than they like
equivalent gains. The endowment effect (e.g. Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1990), status
quo bias (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1991), and the sunk cost fallacy (e.g. Thaler, 1999) are well-
established behavioral regularities which can be attributed to loss aversion. Some studies of
these effects involve cross-modal comparisons involving different types of goods or assets.
For example, Kahneman et al. (1990) observed that participants were reluctant to sell a mug
given to them by the experimenter at the beginning of the experiment. Evidence is mixed on
whether the endowment effect extends to money, as opposed to other goods.1 Becker et al.
(1974) found that participants in a non-incentivized experiment systematically treated outlay
costs differently from opportunity costs. However, Kahneman et al. did not find evidence of
1For a lengthier discussion see Hochman et al. (2014).
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the effect when they used tokens instead of mugs.
Hochman et al. (2014) (henceforth HAA) report an experiment in which participants
perform a series of choice tasks with no objective risk. In each task, participants are presented
with a set of four standard playing cards, from which they must choose one. To each card
is attached a monetary value, which depends on both the suit and the rank of the card. In
one treatment, participants receive an advance payment, which corresponds to a specific
pattern of choices across five out of seven decision tasks. Some of these choices are not
the optimal (earnings-maximizing) ones for their corresponding task. In a control treatment,
participants receive no advance payment. They find that participants who receive prepayment
are more likely to carry out the pre-paid choice even when it is not earnings-maximizing,
while participants who do not receive prepayment are relatively more likely to make the
earnings-maximizing choice. As the choice task involves no objective risk, HAA interpret
this result as supporting loss aversion in money in a very strong form, and label this the
“prepayment effect.”
Such a strong result could have significant implications for the choice architectures firms
use to interact with employees, contractors, and consumers. HAA give an example in which
a firm pre-pays its downstream agents their commissions for selling their product, with the
requirement that those agents pay back commissions should they fall short of their target;
the prepayment effect would suggest these agents are more likely to stick with selling the
firm’s product (as opposed to a rival’s) when they are paid in advance. The phenomenon of
sticking to an apparently suboptimal decision has a parallel in consumer decision-making, in
which it is argued that consumers fail to switch suppliers in markets such as banking, energy,
and telecommunications, even though better plans are on offer (Wilson and Waddams-Price,
2010; Lunn, 2011; Grubb, 2015; Grubb and Osborne, 2015; Sitzia et al., 2015).
In those markets, complexity has been cited as one driver of stickiness in both empirical
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and laboratory studies (Larrick and Soll, 2008; Allcott, 2011; Kalayci and Potters, 2011;
Sitzia and Zizzo, 2011; Grubb and Osborne, 2015). HAA’s card-choice task has only one
complicating feature: the rule to calculate the value of a card depends on its suit. Spades
are worth USD 0.25 times the rank of the card, while all other suits are worth USD 0.10
times the rank of the card. The values of the cards are thus not determined by a single,
common standard (Gaudeul and Sugden, 2012; Piccione and Spiegler, 2012) but depend on
two dimensions, suit and rank. In two of the three conditions reported by HAA, participants
are provided with the monetary value of the cards, either instead of or in addition to the
card’s suit and rank. In those conditions, in which the values of the cards have been in effect
reduced to a common standard, HAA do not observe a prepayment effect. HAA’s experiment
demonstrates that the introduction of a minimally non-common standard can be enough to
affect decision-making significantly.
In this paper, we take a closer look at HAA’s card-choice task to understand more com-
pletely the drivers of the prepayment effect. In Section 2.2, we conduct an analysis of the
experimental design, focusing on their “distant representation” treatment in which values of
cards are not presented using a common standard. Based on previous literature, we iden-
tify a number of candidate factors which might affect a participant’s propensity to choose
a card which does not maximize their earnings. These include features of the choice archi-
tecture – specifically, the content and structure of the experimental instructions – as well
as demographic factors including the participant’s prior experience in experiments and their
self-perception of their ability in mathematics.
Our results in Section 2.3 show that behavior in this simple task depends on these factors.
First, we replicate the prepayment effect reported by HAA using their experimental protocol
and instructions; prepayment can indeed lower the frequency of the earnings-maximizing
choice. We show there are significant and substantial differences in the probability of earn-
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ings maximization as a function of individual characteristics. Participants who report they
are good at mathematics maximize far more often than those who do not, while those who are
having their first experience in an economics experiment are slightly less likely to maximize.
We also find that the prepayment effect largely disappears under rewritten instructions which
describe the transactions that will take place should the participant choose a card other than
the one for which prepayment was made. We conclude in Section 2.4 by discussing how the
results from this simple task, which turn out to be quite rich and interesting, might inform
the applicability of the prepayment effect beyond the laboratory.
2.2 Experimental analysis and design
Our experiment replicates and extends the ”distant representation” condition of Experiment
1A in HAA. There are seven decision tasks. In each task, a participant sees a set of four
playing cards, from which one much be chosen. Each card’s monetary value depends both
on its suit and its rank. For cards which are spades, the value of the card is GBP 0.25 times
rank of the card. There are 5 spades cards in the deck, from ace to five. For all other suits,
the value is GBP 0.10 times the rank of the card. Aces have rank one, so the ace of spades is
worth GBP 0.25 and other aces are worth GBP 0.10. The ranks of jacks, queens, and kings
are 11, 12, and 13, respectively. In HAA spades are valued at USD 0.25 per rank and other
suits at USD 0.10 per rank; our stakes were 50 to 60 percent higher than HAA as measured
by using the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the experiment.
The seven sets of cards, which are provided in Appendices A, are presented in the same
order for each participant. In two sets, a spade is the earnings-maximizing card; these are
called “high-spades” trials. In two other sets, a spade is present, but there is some other non-
spade card in the set which is worth strictly more; these are called “low-spades” trials. HAA
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call the remaining three sets filler trials: of these, one set has a spade and a non-spade card
which are tied as earnings-maximizing cards, and the remaining two sets do not contain any
spade cards. Participants make their choices for all seven sets of cards without any feedback;
a summary screen appears at the end of the session reporting the seven chosen cards, and
calculating the participant’s earnings for the session.2
The experiments were conducted in the laboratory of the Centre for Behavioural and
Experimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia. Participants were
recruited from the lab’s standard subject pool, which is managed using the hRoot system
(Bock et al., 2012). The choice task was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Sessions took place between November 2014 and October 2015, and lasted around 20 to 30
minutes, including all instructions and final payment.
2.2.1 Baseline and replication
Our first objective is to replicate the existence of the prepayment effect within the subject
pool at out laboratory. We conduct two treatments, Post and Pre+Amount, which replicate
the two payment conditions used by HAA. 3 Treatment Post is a stardard post-payment setup:
participants make all seven choices, then see a summary screen which recaps the decisions
and tabulates their earnings. They are then dismissed one-by-one to the payment station and
receive their payments in private before departing the laboratory. Treatment Pre+Amount
implements HAA’s prepayment treatment. Each participant is given GBP 3.75 in cash at
their station prior to making their choices. Participants are told this amount is the sum value
of the five spades cards which will appear among the seven sets (hence the “Amount” in
2Full instructions and screenshots of the decision interface are available in Appendices A.
3We present treatment names in boldface type, choosing names intended to help recall the purpose of each
treatment.
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the treatment’s label). After all seven choices are made, the summary screen appears; this
screen tabulates separately the values of the cards chosen, as well as the value of any spade
cards not chosen. Participants are then dismissed one-by-one to the payment station to settle
payments in private. We carefully kept to the prepayment framing, in that, for any spades
not chosen, we took back coins from the participant, and then gave them different coins for
the cards actually chosen; that is, we did not integrate the two payments into a net payment.4
Hypothesis 1. Participants will choose the earnings-maximizing card more often in Post
than in Pre+Amount, replicating the existence of the prepayment effect.
2.2.2 Influence of the choice environment
HAA attribute the treatment effect they observe between Post and Pre+Amount to the ex-
istence of the prepayment in Pre+Amount. We identify two other ways in which the de-
scription of the experimental task differs between the two treatments. Exploring alternative
instructions serves to map out the robustness of the treatment effect in the lab, but also pro-
vides a link to possible applicability in markets. The description of the experimental task is
the parallel of the contract between firm and downstream sales agents in HAA’s example, or
the terms of a tariff in a consumer’s plan for electricity, gas, or telecommunications.
In Pre+Amount, in order to explain the significance of the GBP 3.75 received in advance
of decisions, the instructions included the following language:
We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the deck randomly ...
The value of the five spades (ace through five) equals a total of three pounds and
seventy-five cents: one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen times 25p
i.e. three pounds and seventy five pence. We will give you this amount up front.
4As all decisions were made by this point in the session, this bit of theatre could not affect results; never-
theless we wanted to be careful to maintain the framing throughout the session.
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No parallel language exists in Post; the total value of spades is not pointed out to participants
explicitly. To identify whether the mere mention of the value of spades might call attention to
spades, or otherwise create a reference point, we conduct treatment Post+Amount, in which
we retain postpayment, but include the language mentioning the total value of spades.
Hypothesis 2. Participants will maximize less frequently in Post+Amount than in Post;
mentioning the value of spades will result in fewer maximizing choices.
A second difference between Post and Pre+Amount is the length and complexity of the
instructions. Describing the prepayment protocol necessarily makes instructions longer, as
there are more steps to explain to participants.
To check on the robustness of the prepayment effect to alternate but in-principle equiva-
lent ways of explaining the mechanism, we replace some of the text from the HAA originals.
Specifically, at the end of their instructions, HAA state,
At the end of the game, if you have not selected all spades, we will pay you for
the cards you have selected, and you will refund us money for the spades you
have not selected.
Our design of alternative phrasing is based on HAA reporting of results from follow-on ex-
periments, which they interpret as indicating that an explicit linkage between amounts of
money and choices of particular cards is important for the prepayment effect to operate. In
our treatment Pre+Amount+Instr, we therefore replace the above sentence with the follow-
ing text intended to highlight that linkage:
For each set of four playing cards, there are three possible scenarios:
• There is not a spade among the four cards. Then, at the end of the session,
15
Information on Advance Instructions
total value payment same as HAA
Post No No Yes
Post+Amount Yes No No
Pre+Amount Yes Yes Yes
Pre+Amount+Instr Yes Yes No
Table 2.1: Summary of experimental treatments.
you will receive a payment for that set equal to the value of the card you
select.
• There is a spade among the four cards, but you select a different card. Then,
at the end of the session, you will pay us back from your up front payment
an amount equal to the value of the spade, and you will receive a payment
from us equal to the value of the card you did select.
• There is a spade among the four cards, and you select the spade. Then,
because you have already received payment for that spade card in your up
front payment, you will not pay us back anything for that set, nor will you
receive any additional payment for that set.
Hypothesis 3. The treatment effect is robust to instructions; the maximization rates will be
comparable in Pre+Amount and Pre+Amount+Instr.
2.2.3 Effects of prior experience
We now turn our attention to the characteristics of the decision-makers themselves. Our next
hypothesis concerns the role of experience. The card choice task in HAA is simple. It is also
artificial, in the sense that the rules for determining valuations of the cards are not drawn
from a game or situation that exists “in the wild.” Participants cannot draw on prior expe-
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rience with the task or very similar ones, in the way that an economic agent might draw on
experience in understanding the implications of prepayment arrangements for commissions.
The artificiality of the task is a useful feature, in that it allows the construction of a
decision problem with the most minimal amount of complexity arising from the lack of a
common standard.5 While we cannot easily address the role that familiarity with this specific
task might play in the persistence of the prepayment effect, we can ask whether participants
who have previous experience with economic experiments behave differently.
Previous experience might predict behavior for two reasons. First, previous experience
may affect expectations about how lab experiments operate in a generalized sense. Expe-
rience has been shown to have an effect in, for example, public goods games (Conte et al.,
2014) and allocation games (Matthey and Regner, 2013). Some of the effect of experience
in games would be due to more accurate beliefs about the play of others, an aspect that is
absent in this individual decision task. Nevertheless prior experience may be valuable, inso-
far as participants will have familiarity with general lab procedures, including how to read
and extract relevant information from instructions. Participants with prior experience also
have self-selected into coming back to the laboratory. Abeler and Nosenzo (2014) have stud-
ied self-selection into participant pools and report that interest in monetary rewards appears
strongly to drive participation.
Both channels would suggest experienced participants would be more likely to maxi-
mize earnings. To explore the possible role of experience with experiments, we conducted
a stratified recruiting strategy. We identified very experienced participants as those who had
participated at least 10 times previously in experimental sessions, and somewhat less ex-
perienced participants as those who had participated no more than 5 times. We recruited
5Schram (2005) is a good discussion of the tradeoffs between internal and external validity arising from the
artificiality of laboratory games.
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approximately equal numbers of participants from these two subpopulations. Those who
had participated 6 to 9 times were not recruited, to give a more clear distinction between the
groups.
Hypothesis 4. Participant with greater experience in experiments will have higher maxi-
mization rates in prepayment treatments.
2.2.4 Effects of confidence at the specific task
The distant representation condition we focus on in our experiment is one of three conditions
in the full Experiment 1A design of HAA. In their close representation condition, payoffs
were represented not by playing cards, but directly expressed as amounts of money. In the
moderate representation condition, payoffs were depicted using playing cards, but with a
label indicating their monetary value. HAA find evidence of the prepayment effect only in
the distant representation condition.
The distant representation requires a particular type of operation, mathematical calcu-
lation, for participants to infer the earnings consequences of the options they face. The
arithmetic required is taught at an early age in schools, and can be taken as part of the as-
sumed skills an undergraduate student at a university would have. Although the arithmetic
is straightforward enough, studies such as Pajares and Miller (1994) have noted that many
adults dislike and avoid math, even those who are competent at calculation. Ashcraft (2002)
observes effects of math anxiety even on simple whole-number arithmetic problems. It has
been argued that math anxiety could shape individuals’ behavior when facing challenging
circumstances (Bandura, 1977)
The design of the card choice task requires participants to carry out, on demand, a mathe-
matical calculation in the context of a novel setting not previously encountered. Prepayment
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may be an effective tactic when the task to determine the earnings-maximizing choice re-
quires an activity the decision-maker is disinclined to carry out. To investigate this, within
a battery of demographics questions asked at the end of the session, after all choices were
made, we include a question asking participants,“Do you consider yourself good at mathe-
matics?” This was implemented as a radio box, with options for Yes, No, or “Prefer not to
say” as the possible responses. Such self-reports of mathematical skill have been used as
a behavioral indicator in economics and psycholgy (e.g. Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001; Ashcraft
and Ridley, 2005; Marsh et al., 2012; Buser et al., 2014).6
Hypothesis 5. Participants who report confidence in their ability to carry out mathematical
calculations will have higher maximization rates.
2.3 Results
We report on 206 participants who participated in the task. Within our sample, the breakdown
of males (44.2%) and females7 is comparable to our participant pool and the University’s
student body as a whole. Less-experienced participants had participated, on average, in
1.78 previous sessions, while the very-experienced participants had been in 15.67 previous
sessions on average. A total of 106 (51.5%) considered themselves good at mathematics,
with 86 (41.7%) saying they were not; 14 preferred not to say.
We conducted Fisher’s exact test for independence between each pair out of the four de-
mographic characteristics of math-confidence, prior experience, gender, and native English
6We prefer the participant’s self-reported confidence level rather than their actual mathematical ability. We
placed no time restrictions or pressures on the individual decisions, and we are confident out students are capa-
ble, in principle at least, of carry out the required calculations correctly. Our hypothesis instead centers around
the possibility that some participants feel less attracted or inclined to engage with the required computational
task.
7One participant declined to disclose their gender.
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Table 2.2: Low-spade maximization rates by treatments and demographics.
Maximizing
Subsample Group N All 0/2 1/2 2/2
HAA results Post 61 95.1 0.0 9.8 90.2
HAA results Pre+Amount 50 66.0 20.0 28.0 52.0
Treatment Post 49 79.6 10.2 20.4 69.4
Treatment Pre+Amount 54 60.2 22.2 35.2 42.6
Treatment Post+Amount 49 73.5 10.2 32.7 57.1
Treatment Pre+Amount+Instr 54 70.4 18.5 22.2 59.3
Prior experience 0 to 5 sessions 112 70.1 16.1 27.7 56.3
Prior experience 10 or more sessions 94 71.3 14.9 27.7 57.5
Math-confident No 86 59.3 22.1 37.2 40.7
Math-confident Yes 106 78.8 12.2 17.9 69.8
Math-confident Decline to say 14 78.6 0.0 42.9 57.1
Gender Female 114 66.2 19.3 29.0 51.8
Gender Male 91 76.4 11.0 25.3 63.8
Native English speaker No 73 66.4 19.2 28.8 52.1
Native English speaker Yes 130 74.2 12.3 26.9 60.8
Degree course Not economics 179 67.6 16.8 31.3 52.0
Degree course Economics 25 90.0 8.0 4.0 88.0
This table reports low-spade maximization rates disaggregated by treatments and demo-
graphic characteristics. The first two rows report the comparable results from HAA. Not
all demographics breakouts of our data add up to N = 206 due to blank responses.
speaking.8 The only pair for which the null hypothesis of independence is rejected at the
10% level is between gender and math-confidence: 61.5% of males (56 in total) answered
this question in the affirmative, as opposed to 43.9% of females (50 in total); the difference is
significant with a p-value of 0.008. Previous studies (Eccles, 1998; Buser et al., 2014) have
also observed greater reported confidence in mathematics among males than females.
8Because our participants are drawn from across the student body and therefore a wide range of degree
courses, we omit degree course here. We do look subsequently at the performance of students of economics,
of whom there are few and are approximately equally scattered across the treatments.
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The results in HAA focus on the rate of maximization by participants in the two “low-
spades” trials, in which a spade card is present but is not the earnings-maximizing choice.
We report this measure for each treatment in Table 2.2, where we also present breakouts of
the low-spade maximization rate overall for each characteristic. The rightmost three columns
in Table 2.2 give the percentages of participants who maximize on none, one, or both of the
low-spades trials.9 In general, the modal outcome for a participant is to maximize on both
low-spades trials, with maximizing on exactly one of the two being more likely than failing
to maximize on either.
We will base our tests principally on the distributions of the maximization counts by
participant. For this our workhorse will be the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test. In
addition to p-values, we report an effect size for each instance of the MWW test. Given two
groups with sample sizes n1 and n2, respectively, and a MWW test statistic value U , the
effect size is given by r = U/
√
n1n2. This is the estimate of Pr(x2 > x1) + 12Pr(x2 = x1),
where xi is a randomly drawn individual from group i = 1, 2.
We look at the relationship between individual characteristics of our participants and their
rates of maximization on low-spades trials. We break out the low-spades maximization data
by characteristic and by treatment in Table 2.3 for characteristics on which we did not make
a priori hypotheses (gender and native language), and in Table 2.5 for those on which we did
make hypotheses (experience and mathematics self-confidence). Each characteristic divides
our sample into two groups.10 To look for evidence of an overall effect on maximization
rates due to the characteristic, for each treatment we compare the distribution of low-spades
maximization rates between the groups using MWW. Because each treatment is an indepen-
9A more detailed summary of distributions of choices broken down by each of the seven sets is in Appen-
dices C.
10In what follows, we omit the participants who did not respond to one or more of the demographics ques-
tions.
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Table 2.3: Low-spade maximization rates by treatment and demographics.
(a) By gender
Gender = Female Gender = Male
Maximizing Maximizing
Treatment N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 r p
Post 24 70.8 16.7 25.0 58.3 22 88.6 4.6 13.6 81.8 .377 .077
Pre+Amount 21 42.9 38.1 38.1 23.8 26 69.2 15.3 30.8 53.9 .321 .025
Post+Amount 26 73.1 11.5 30.8 57.7 20 75.0 10.0 30.0 60.0 .487 .860
Pre+Amount+Instr 33 68.1 18.2 27.3 54.6 18 80.6 11.1 16.7 72.2 .412 .235
Fisher combined probability test of equality of distribution for all treatments .047
(b) By native English speaker
Native English speaker = No Native English speaker = Yes
Maximizing Maximizing
Treatment N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 r p
Post 16 81.3 6.3 25.0 68.8 30 78.3 13.3 16.7 70.0 .495 .943
Pre+Amount 16 62.5 25.0 25.0 50.0 31 54.8 25.8 38.7 35.5 .444 .502
Post+Amount 13 53.8 23.1 46.2 30.8 33 81.8 6.1 24.2 69.7 .709 .013
Pre+Amount+Instr 21 61.9 28.6 19.1 52.3 30 80.0 12.9 26.6 60.5 .603 .153
Fisher combined probability test of equality of distribution for all treatments .083
This table reports low-spade maximization rates by treatment for characteristics without prior hypotheses. All
reports overall maximization rate; k/2 the proportion of participants who maximized on k of the low spades
trials, k = 0, 1, 2. r and p report the effect size and p-value, respectively, of the MWW test for equality of
distribution across the characteristic, for the given treatment. The Fisher combined probability method is used
to report a p-value for the joint null hypothesis of no effect due to characteristics across all treatments.
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dent sample, the four tests by treatment are independent tests. We aggregate the p-values of
the individual tests for the four treatments using the combined probability method of Fisher
(1925).
Overall, unconditional on treatment, males (76.4%) maximized more often than females
(66.2%). Table 2.3a shows that males have a higher maximization rate in all treatments. The
overall test for a gender effect is significant at the 5% level (p = .047).11 Participants who are
native speakers of English (74.2%) maximized more often than those who are not (66.4%).
Table 2.3b shows a less uniform pattern across treatments. Non-native speakers are much
less likely to maximize than native speakers in Post+Amount and Pre+Amount+Instr. The
overall test for an effect due to native English speaking is significant at the 10% level (p =
.083).
We observe (with admitted pleasure) that students on economics courses choose the earn-
ings maximizing card more often (90.0%) than those on other courses (67.6%).12 Among
economics students, 18 (72.0%) identified as being good at mathematics, and 3 (12.0%) de-
clined to say, while among students from other schools, 86 (48.0%) said they were good at
mathematics, and 11 (6.2%) declined to say. These distributions are significantly different
(p = .009 using Fisher’s exact test for independence). A variety of approaches have been
used in the literature as to whether to include, exclude, or control for the presence of eco-
nomics students in experimental samples, often depending on the research question to hand.
Friesen and Earl (2015) found that students with economics training perform better in tasks
involving choices with multipart tariffs. In the UK university system, students do not in
general take courses on other subjects, and so we can say that non-economics students in
our sample would be unlikely to have much undergraduate-level training in economic rea-
11We note that all sessions were led by the same female experimenter.
12We omit the breakout table due to the low numbers of economics students. Carrying out the same procedure
as above results in a p-value of .103 for the combined probability test of no effect due to course of study.
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soning. Nevertheless, we cannot distinguish whether the effect would be due to selection of
students into the economics program, or whether training in the type of economic models
that motivate experiments in economics makes students more likely to recognize and choose
the earnings-maximizing card. As the economics students are small in number and spread
uniformly across the four treatments, we omit this characteristic in further analysis.
We now look at the characteristics on which we set hypotheses. Participants with 10
or more sessions of experience maximized on 71.3% of trials overall, compared to 70.1%
among those with 5 or fewer sessions. Table 2.5a shows that the two groups have similar
maximization rates for each treatment; the overall combined probability test returns a p-
value of .953, indicating no evidence of any systematic effect.
The maximization rate for those reporting they were good at math is 78.8%, compared
to 59.3% for those saying they were not. A total of 14 participants declined to answer
this question. Their overall maximization rate is 78.6%, suggesting they are more similar
to those answering the question yes than those answering no; we drop these 14 from the
analyses below. Table 2.5b shows that the math-confident participants maximize much more
often in three of the four treatments, with the notable exception being Pre+Amount. The
overall combined probability test results in a p-value of .0002, indicating strong evidence
that the answer to this question predicts low-spade maximization behavior.
We begin the statement of the formal results following from our hypothesis by evaluating
our replication of HAA’s results in our overall participant pool.
Result 1 We replicate HAA’s result that the maximization rate on low-spades trials is lower
in Pre+Amount than in Post. The maximization rate in Pre+Amount is comparable in our
data and HAA, but we observe a significantly lower maximization rate in Post. The magni-
tude of the treatment effect is therefore smaller in our data overall.
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Table 2.5: Low-spade maximization rates by treatment and individual characteristics.
(a) By prior experience
Prior experience ∈ [0, 5] Prior experience ≥ 10
Maximizing Maximizing
Treatment N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 r p
Post 24 79.2 16.7 8.3 75.0 22 79.5 4.6 31.9 63.6 .468 .644
Pre+Amount 23 56.5 23.1 34.8 39.1 24 58.3 25.0 33.3 41.7 .513 .874
Post+Amount 27 70.4 14.8 29.6 55.6 19 78.9 5.3 31.6 63.1 .554 .484
Pre+Amount+Instr 29 74.1 10.3 31.0 58.6 22 70.5 22.7 13.6 63.6 .503 .965
Fisher combined probability test of equality of distribution for all treatments .953
(b) By math-confidence
Math-confident = No Math-confident = Yes
Maximizing Maximizing
Treatment N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 r p
Post 18 69.4 11.1 38.9 50.0 28 85.7 10.7 7.1 82.1 .356 .044
Pre+Amount 17 55.9 23.5 41.2 35.3 30 58.3 26.7 30.0 43.3 .479 .804
Post+Amount 18 63.9 16.7 38.9 44.4 28 80.4 7.1 25.0 67.9 .376 .109
Pre+Amount+Instr 31 56.5 25.8 35.5 38.7 20 97.5 0.0 5.0 95.0 .212 .0001
Fisher combined probability test of equality of distribution for all treatments .0002
This table reports low-spade maximization rates by treatment, for characteristics with prior hypotheses. All
reports overall maximization rate; k/2 reports the proportion of participants who maximized on k of the low
spades trials, k = 0, 1, 2. r and p report the effect size and p-value, respectively, of the MWW test for equality of
distribution across the characteristic, for the given treatment. The Fisher combined probability method is used to
report a p-value for the joint null hypothesis of no effect due to characteristics across all treatments.
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Support. As we do not have demographics breakouts for HAA’s participants, we test Hy-
pothesis 1 using aggregate data for all participants irrespective of demographics. Table 2.2
reports an overall low-spades maximization rate of 79.6% in Post, which decreases to 60.2%
in Pre+Amount. We reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of maximization rates
are the same in both treatments (MWW, r = .639, p = .0069).
The overall maximization rates on low-spades trials in Pre+Amount are similar in our
data (60.2%) and HAA (66.0%); the distributions are not statistically different (MWW,
r = .543, p = .41). Our results differ significantly in Post, where HAA report a 95.1%
maximization rate as opposed to our 79.6% (MWW, r = .609, p = .0042).
As shown above, there are patterns in maximization rates when participants are broken
out in groups by individual characteristics. We can therefore do a more detailed analysis
of our data for Post and Pre+Amount, as summarized in Table 2.7a. For each group we
test the null hypothesis that the maximization rate is the same in Post and Pre+Amount,
which generates the effect size r and p-value reported in the Table. The two tests on the
groups generated by a characteristic are independent; for each characteristic we aggregate
the results of the two tests using Fisher’s method. Using this approach, we find the evidence
for Result 1 is robust to breaking out the data by each of the four characteristics.
Result 2 The mere mention of the total value of spades does not significantly affect behav-
ior in postpayment conditions. The largest effect size is observed among non-native speakers
of English, who maximize less often when the total value of spades is mentioned than when
it is not.
Support. Overall we observe a low-spade maximization rate of 73.5% in treatment Post+Amount
as opposed to the 79.6% rate observed in Post. These overall rates are not statistically
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Table 2.7: Summary of tests comparing low-spade maximization rates across treatments.
(a) Post versus Pre+Amount
Characteristic Group r p Group r p Combined
Gender Male .643 .041 Female .688 .021 .0069
Native English speaker Yes .668 .013 No .617 .198 .018
Math-confident Yes .688 .0046 No .596 .292 .011
Experience ≥ 10 sessions .642 .069 0-5 sessions .661 .033 .016
(b) Post versus Post+Amount
Characteristic Group r p Group r p Combined
Gender Male .609 .127 Female .492 .913 .365
Native English speaker Yes .490 .871 No .704 .039 .150
Math-confident Yes .561 .304 No .539 .665 .525
Experience ≥ 10 sessions .504 .963 0-5 sessions .579 .256 .592
(c) Pre+Amount versus Pre+Amount+Instr
Characteristic Group r p Group r p Combined
Gender Male .412 .259 Female .329 .025 .038
Native English speaker Yes .323 .0090 No .500 1.000 .051
Math-confident Yes .235 .0002 No .494 .945 .0020
Experience ≥ 10 sessions .411 .257 0-5 sessions .380 .107 .126
(d) Post versus Pre+Amount+Instr
Characteristic Group r p Group r p Combined
Gender Male .552 .444 Female .519 .786 .717
Native English speaker Yes .504 .942 No .612 .191 .489
Math-confident Yes .433 .172 No .587 .279 .194
Experience ≥ 10 sessions .533 .660 0-5 sessions .560 .370 .589
This table reports the summary of tests comparing low-spade maximization rates across treatments. MWW
is used for the individual test of each group. Effect sizes r are reported such that r > .5 corresponds to a
higher rate in the treatment listed first. Combined gives the p-value of obtained by aggregating the results
of the MWW tests for the corresponding groups using Fisher’s combined probability test.
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different (MWW, r = .555, p = .27). Table 2.8b reports on the results of this compar-
ison applied to each group generated by individual characteristics, in which we see that
no treatment difference is established when looking across any of the characteristics. The
largest effect size, and smallest p-value, is found among non-native speakers of English
(r = .704, p = .039); this group’s maximization rate drops from 81.3% in Post to 53.8%
in Post+Amount, whereas native English speakers do not show a similar pattern. This p-
value is not small enough to obtain significance at the 10% level, using the Holm-Bonferroni
method to account for the multiple tests.
Result 3 The alternate instructions rephrasing the link between each set and payment lead
to higher maximization rates, comparable to the baseline postpayment treatment.
Support. Overall, the low-spade maximization rate in Pre+Amount+Instr is 70.4%, which
is between the 79.6% observed in Post and 60.2% in Pre+Amount. However, in Table 2.5a
we note that in Pre+Amount+Instr a majority of participants did not consider themselves
good at math, which is the opposite pattern from the other three treatments. The results of
tests controlling for each individual characteristic are shown in Table 2.7c for Pre+Amount
versus Pre+Amount+Instr, and Table 2.7d for Post versus Pre+Amount+Instr. The null
hypothesis of no difference in distribution is not rejected for any of the tests between Post
and Pre+Amount+Instr. On the other hand, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected when
controlling for math-confidence when comparing Pre+Amount and Pre+Amount+Instr
(p = .0020), as well as rejected at 5% when controlling for gender (p = .038) and 10%
when controlling for native English speaking (p = .051).
Our formulation of Hypothesis 2 specifically related to the mention of spades under the
postpayment condition only, and Hypothesis 3 the effects of rephrasing instructions under
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prepayment. All treatments other than Post involved a mention of the total value of spades in
the instructions. Ex post, we observe in Table 2.3b that the maximization rate for non-native
speakers is more than 20 percentage points lower across these three treatments in which the
total value of spades is mentioned, compared to Post. While Pre+Amount+Instr results in
an increase in maximization for native English speakers compared to Pre+Amount, a similar
effect is not evident among non-native speakers.
We now look more specifically at the two individual characteristics on which we had set
prior hypotheses.
Result 4 We do not find any evidence that participants who have participated in 10 or more
previous sessions are more or less likely to maximize earnings than those who have been in
1 to 5 sessions previously.
Support. Table 2.5a presents MWW tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in maxi-
mizing rates between the two experience groups. The null hypothesis is not rejected for any
treatment; p-values are uniformly high and effect sizes are uniformly close to .5, correspond-
ing to no effect. Of the four individual characteristics considered, breakouts by experience
show the least between-group variation within each treatment, as well as the least evidence
for any differential treatment effects.
Result 5 Reported mathematics confidence overall is a strong predictor of the likelihood
to choose earnings-maximizing cards in low-spades trials. However, the treatment difference
in Post versus Pre+Amount+Instr is accounted for mainly by its effect among participants
who identify as being good at math.
Support. Table 2.5b presents MWW tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in maxi-
mizing rates. Overall, there is evidence of a strong effect correlating to the answer to this
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question (p = .0002). The effect is not uniform across treatments. In Post, those identi-
fying as good at math maximize significantly more often, by an 85.7% to 69.4% margin;
the MWW test shows this difference is significant (r = .356, p = .044). Likewise there
is a difference between the groups in Pre+Amount+Instr, with math-confident participants
maximizing on 97.5% of trials and others on 56.5% (MWW r = .212, p = .0001). However,
in Pre+Amount the performance of the two groups is not distinguished; math-confident par-
ticipants maximize on 58.3% of trials and others on 55.9% (MWW r = .479, p = .804).
The positive correlation overall between math-confidence and performance on the task
is intuitive, although it is interesting that it comes through so strongly on a task which
might not seem that demanding at first look. More surprising is the result that it is math-
confident participants whose maximization rates lower most sharply in Pre+Amount. When
we look only at math-confident participants, the size of our treatment effect between Post
and Pre+Amount is comparable to the results reported by HAA. We observe a drop in max-
imization rate from 85.7% to 58.3% in this group, and HAA report a drop from 95.1% to
66.0%. HAA conducted their experiments at Duke University, a private institution that is one
of the most selective in the United States. Our replication was done at a middle-tier public
university in the United Kingdom, which is best known for its degree programs in areas such
as literature and creative writing, and which offers no engineering or physics courses at all.
It is plausible that our participants who identify as math-confident are more comparable to
the sample at Duke; if that is the case, our results provide a firm replication of HAA’s effect.
Our results seem rule out an account in which the treatment effect between Post and
Pre+Amount occurs due to less-numerate participants making more frequent calculation
errors in Pre+Amount. Such a hypothesis would be supported by a larger drop in the max-
imization rate of participants with less math-confidence; we find exactly the opposite. The
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lack of a large treatment effect among less math-confident participants may arise because of
the extra noise due to a higher error rate in the arithmetic calculations required; the higher
baseline maximization rate of math-confident participants in Post makes it easier to pick up
a treatment effect.
Although math-confident participants may not be making arithmetic errors, they may still
be making errors in judgment in Pre+Amount due to other factors.13 If this is the case, then
alternative phrasings like those in Pre+Amount+Instr may have the effect of debiasing the
decision-maker. These effects have been explored in psychology (e.g. Evans et al., 1994), law
(e.g. Babcock et al., 1997), and accounting (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2002) as well as economics
(e.g. List, 2001). In the case of the instructions used in Treatment Pre+Amount+Instr,
explicitly stepping through the process by which payments will be realized might influence
whatever processes participants use to come to their decisions.
2.4 Conclusion
HAA reported a striking result: in a simple choice task with no objective risk, participants
were less likely to choose earnings-maximizing cards when they received a prepayment
based on some other, non-earnings-maximizing choice. We have shown this effect is quali-
tatively robust, even with a different participant pool and somewhat higher incentives.
Given the apparently straightforward calculations required to maximize earnings in this
decision task, it is remarkable that undergraduate students both at Duke (HAA) and Univer-
sity of East Anglia (this paper) would, overall, leave money on the table. We therefore take a
13For the purposes of this paper, we put to one side the question of normative implications. If a decision-
maker is truly loss-averse, then choosing the non-earnings-maximizing card might be viewed as optimal from
the perspective of their preferences. McQuillin and Sugden (2012) provide one survey of the issues in recon-
ciling behavioral and normative economics.
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closer look at this decision task, both to map out the extent to which maximization rates de-
pend on details of the experimental protocol, and to understand better whether certain types
of participants are less likely to maximize earnings.
We find that the effect of prepayment does depend on the description of the experimen-
tal task. The methodological observation that participant decisions are not independent of
instructions is hardly novel, but the potential practical implications are noteworthy. We can
think of the description of the experimental task as the analog of the description of offers to
consumers or terms and conditions of agency contracts. One interpretation of HAA’s results
and our replication is that it is easy to influence decisions, even when there is no objec-
tive risk and the choice architecture is not very complex. HAA’s instructions, used in the
Pre+Amount treatment, while brief, are not overtly misleading. Our Pre+Amount+Instr
instructions are somewhat more explicit, which may serve a debiasing function. A regulator
whose objective was to keep people from making apparently suboptimal decisions might find
descriptions similar to ours preferable because of their debiasing effects. However, creating
effective written communication is challenging.14 Because instructions like HAA’s are not
overtly misleading, and because the effect of written communication on an audience is diffi-
cult to judge, even by experienced writers, the regulator might find it difficult to distinguish
between well-intentioned but unclear writing, as opposed to deliberate obfuscation.
We also find that characteristics of the participant are strong predictors of the maximiza-
tion rate. Participants who state they do not consider themselves to be good at math maximize
far less frequently; the magnitude of the difference is comparable to the magnitude of the pre-
payment effect between Post and Pre+Amount. HAA only observed the prepayment effect
when participants needed to carry out mathematical calculations to determine the values of
14Pinker (1994, 2014) discusses some reasons why writing for clear communication is difficult, and even
writers sincerely attempting to be clear may not be successful.
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the cards.
Experience can sometimes serve to correct apparent errors in judgment or decisions made
by relatively inexperienced decision-makers. Participants who have been in previous lab ex-
periments have some experience with processing the information in experimental instruc-
tions, which are the terms and conditions under which experimenters offer participants the
chance to earn money. We find at most a modest effect of general experience in laboratory
experiments on performance in this task.
This simple choice task devised by HAA generates an interesting amount of variation in
performance, depending on how it is presented, and on the characteristics of the decision-
makers. The task is sufficiently stylized that broad claims about external validity should be
tempered. However, the stark simplicity of the setting helps to illustrate some possible subtle
mechanisms firms could use to influence the behavior of agents or consumers, with corre-
sponding implications for the problems that market designers or regulators face in evaluating
the appropriateness of the structure of contracts or offers.
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2.5 Appendices A
Comparison of instructions
In this appendix, we provide the full text of the instructions for each of the four treatments.
In addition, we provide the instructions as used by Hochman et al. (2014) for comparison.
Treatment Post
This paper
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will
receive your earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instruc-
tions as they are read aloud.
On your computer monitor, you will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several
times. Each time, you will select and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have se-
lected. Each card is worth its point value times 10p, so a three is worth three times 10p, a
nine is worth nine times 10p, et cetera. Aces are worth 10p, jacks are worth eleven times
10p, queens are worth twelve times 10p, and kings are worth thirteen times 10p.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades (♠) are worth
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their point value times 25p, not 10p. The ace of spades is worth 25p, the two of spades is
worth two times 25p, and so on.
At the end of the game, we will pay you for the cards you have selected.
HAA
Thank you for your participation. Feel free to ask questions at any time if anything is
unclear. There are no tricks or catches to this game, we simply ask that you pay attention to
the instructions and think carefully about your decisions. You will be paid some amount of
money at the end of the game; how much you are paid will be determined by the decisions
you make.
You will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several times. Each time, you will
select and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have se-
lected.
Each card is worth its point value in dimes, so a three is worth three dimes, a nine is
worth nine dimes, et cetera. Aces are worth one dime, jacks are worth eleven dimes, queens
are worth twelve, and kings are worth thirteen.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades are worth their
point value in quarters, not dimes. The ace of spades is worth one quarter, the two of spades
is worth two quarters, and so on. We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the
deck randomly.
At the end of the game, we will pay you for the cards you have selected.
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Treatment Post+Amount
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will
receive your earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instruc-
tions as they are read aloud.
On your computer monitor, you will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several
times. Each time, you will select and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have se-
lected.
Each card is worth its point value times 10p, so a three is worth three times 10p, a nine
is worth nine times 10p, et cetera. Aces are worth 10p, jacks are worth eleven times 10p,
queens are worth twelve times 10p, and kings are worth thirteen times 10p.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades (♠) are worth
their point value times 25p, not 10p. The ace of spades is worth 25p, the two of spades is
worth two times 25p, and so on. We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the
deck randomly. The value of the five spades, ace through five, equals a total of three pounds
and seventy-five pence: one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen times 25p i.e.
three pounds and seventy-five pence.
At the end of the game, we will pay you for the cards you have selected.
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Treatment Pre+Amount
This paper
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will
receive your earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instruc-
tions as they are read aloud.
On your computer monitor, you will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several
times. Each time, you will select and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have se-
lected. Each card is worth its point value times 10p, so a three is worth three times 10p, a
nine is worth nine times 10p, et cetera. Aces are worth 10p, jacks are worth eleven times
10p, queens are worth twelve times 10p, and kings are worth thirteen times 10p.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades (♠) are worth
their point value times 25p, not 10p. The ace of spades is worth 25p, the two of spades is
worth two times 25p, and so on. We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the
deck randomly.
The value of the five spades (ace through five) equals a total of three pounds and seventy-
five pence: one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen times 25p i.e. three pounds
and seventy-five pence. We will give you this amount up front.
However, if you do not choose all of the five spade cards, you will need to give us back
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some of this money at the end of the game. The amount you return will be the value of the
spade card(s) that you did NOT choose.
For example, if you do not pick up the three of spades, you will return three times 25p to
us from your three pounds and seventy-five pence.
At the end of the game, if you have not selected all spades, we will pay you for the cards
you have selected, and you will refund us money for the spades you have not selected.
HAA
Thank you for your participation. Feel free to ask questions at any time if anything is
unclear. There are no tricks or catches to this game, we simply ask that you pay attention to
the instructions and think carefully about your decisions. You will be paid some amount of
money at the end of the game; how much you are paid will be determined by the decisions
you make.
You will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several times. Each time, you will
select and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have se-
lected. Each card is worth its point value in dimes, so a three is worth three dimes, a nine is
worth nine dimes, et cetera. Aces are worth one dime, jacks are worth eleven dimes, queens
are worth twelve, and kings are worth thirteen.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades are worth their
point value in quarters, not dimes. The ace of spades is worth one quarter, the two of spades
is worth two quarters, and so on. We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the
deck randomly.
The value of the five spades (ace through five) equals a total of three dollars and seventy-
five cents: one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen quarters i.e. three dollars and
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seventy five cents. We will give you these fifteen quarters up front.
However, if you do not choose all of the five spade cards, you will need to give us back
some of this money at the end of the game. The amount you return will be the value of the
spade card(s) that you did NOT choose.
For example, if you do not pick up the three of spades, you will return three quarters to
us from your three dollars and seventy-five cents.
At the end of the game, if you have not select all spades, we will pay you for the cards
you have selected, and you will refund us money for the spades you have not selected.
Treatment Pre+Amount+Instr
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you follow the instructions
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will
receive your earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instruc-
tions as they are read aloud.
On your computer monitor, you will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several
times. No card will appear more than one time during the experiment. Each time, you will
select and keep one card. After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the
cards you have selected.
The value of a card to you depends on the card’s suit and point value. Spades (♠) are
worth their point value times 25p. The ace of spades is worth 25p, the two of spades is worth
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two times 25p, and so on.
We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the deck randomly. The values
of these five spades (ace through five) equal a total of three pounds and seventy-five pence,
because one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen times 25p is three pounds and
seventy-five pence. We will give you this amount up front.
Cards of the other suits, hearts (♥), diamonds (♦), and clubs (♣), are worth their point
value times 10p. So, a three is worth three times 10p, a nine is worth nine times 10p, et
cetera. In these suits, aces are worth 10p, jacks are worth eleven times 10p, queens are worth
twelve times 10p, and kings are worth thirteen times 10p.
At the end of the experiment, you will leave the lab with a total payment equal to the
sum of the values of the cards you select. For each set of four playing cards, there are three
possible scenarios:
• There is not a spade among the four cards. Then, at the end of the session, you will
receive a payment for that set equal to the value of the card you select.
• There is a spade among the four cards, but you select a different card. Then, at the end
of the session, you will pay us back from your up front payment an amount equal to
the value of the spade, and you will receive a payment from us equal to the value of
the card you did select. For example, if you did not select three of spades but instead
select four of diamonds; we will pay you 40p corresponding to the four of diamonds
and you need to refund us 3 times 25p corresponding to the three of spades.
• There is a spade among the four cards, and you select the spade. Then, because you
have already received payment for that spade card in your up front payment, you will
not pay us back anything for that set, nor will you receive any additional payment for
that set.
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Screenshots of participant interface
Figure 2.1: Screenshot of Set 1 (unselected) in the experiment
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Figure 2.2: Screenshot of Set 1 (selected) in the experiment
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Figure 2.3: Screenshot of summary screen
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All sets in the experiment
Figure 2.4: All sets in the experiment
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Choice distributions at the set level
In this section we provide a more detailed view on the seven sets of cards faced by the
participants. In each table, the first row shows the four cards that were used in the set.
The next row contains the values of the cards; the data for the card(s) which maximize
earnings are displayed in bold. The total number of choices and corresponding frequencies
for each card are presented for each treatment, Post, Post+Amount, Pre+Amount, and
Pre+Amount+Instr, in separate rows, recalling that Post and Pre+Amount are replications
of HAA’s.
Table 2.9: Summary of Choices in the 7 Sets
Set 1 Q♥ 4♣ 6♦ 6♥
Value GBP 1.20 GBP 0.40 GBP 0.60 GBP 0.60
Post 94% 46 4% 2 2% 1 0% 0
Post+Amount 88% 43 8% 4 2% 1 2% 1
Pre+Amount 96% 52 4% 2 0% 0 0% 0
Pre+Amount+Instr 87% 47 6% 3 7% 4 0% 0
Set 2 2♥ 3♦ 5♠ 3♥
Value GBP 0.20 GBP 0.30 GBP 1.25 GBP 0.30
Post 0% 0 0% 0 100% 49 0% 0
Post+Amount 0% 0 6% 3 94% 46 0% 0
Pre+Amount 0% 0 2% 1 98% 53 0% 0
Pre+Amount+Instr 0% 0 7% 4 93% 50 0% 0
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Set 3 J♦ 4♠ 7♥ 9♥
Value GBP 1.10 GBP 1.00 GBP 0.70 GBP 0.90
Post 73% 36 27% 13 0% 0 0% 0
Post+Amount 71% 35 29% 14 0% 0 0% 0
Pre+Amount 54% 29 46% 25 0% 0 0% 0
Pre+Amount+Instr 65% 35 30% 16 2% 1 4% 2
Set 4 J♣ K♦ 7♦ 6♣
Value GBP 1.10 GBP 1.30 GBP 0.70 GBP 0.60
Post 2% 1 98% 48 0% 0 0% 0
Post+Amount 6% 3 92% 45 0% 0 2% 1
Pre+Amount 2% 1 96% 52 0% 0 2% 1
Pre+Amount+Instr 2% 1 96% 52 2% 1 0% 0
Set 5 4♥ 10♦ A♠ 8♥
Value GBP 0.40 GBP 1.00 GBP 0.25 GBP 0.80
Post 0% 0 86% 42 14% 7 0% 0
Post+Amount 0% 0 76% 37 22% 11 2% 1
Pre+Amount 0% 0 67% 36 31% 17 2% 1
Pre+Amount+Instr 0% 0 76% 41 20% 11 4% 2
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Set 6 3♠ 2♣ A♦ 4♦
Value GBP 0.75 GBP 0.20 GBP 0.10 GBP 0.40
Post 86% 42 0% 0 4% 2 10% 5
Post+Amount 67% 33 0% 0 12% 6 20% 10
Pre+Amount 87% 47 2% 1 0% 0 11% 6
Pre+Amount+Instr 80% 43 2% 1 6% 3 13% 7
Set 7 5♦ 2♦ 3♣ 2♠
Value GBP 0.50 GBP 0.20 GBP 0.30 GBP 0.50
Post 53% 26 0% 0 2% 1 45% 22
Post+Amount 41% 20 0% 0 0% 0 59% 29
Pre+Amount 7% 4 0% 0 0% 0 93% 50
Pre+Amount+Instr 15% 8 0% 0 0% 0 85% 46
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Chapter 3
What’s ours is ours: An experiment on
the efficiency of bargaining over the
fruits of joint activity
3.1 Introduction
The Treaty of Hong Canal is an influential event in the history of China. Chu and Han were
two kingdoms who challenged the authority of the incumbent Qin dynasty. After a long
military campaign, they were successful in deposing the Qin, before falling into contention
with each other. In 203BC they reached a cease-fire agreement known as the “Treaty of Hong
Canal”. They agreed that areas west of the canal would belong to Chu, and those to the east
of it to Han. Although ultimately Han prevailed and formed the next imperial dynasty in
China, the story became an influential allegory for conflict and agreement. It appears in
the layout of Chinese chess board, in which the starting positions of the players are divided
by the “river”, which is a stylised depiction of the Hong Canal and refers to the Chu-Han
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contention.
The Hong Canal may have served as a kind of focal point (Schelling, 1980) in resolv-
ing, at least temporarily, the conflict between Chu and Han. Since Schelling, it has been
established that players can coordinate using “cues” that classical game theory considers ir-
relevant. Experimental evidences, including Mehta et al. (1994), Isoni et al. (2013), Isoni
et al. (2014), Crawford et al. (2008), Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) and Bardsley et al.
(2010a) have shown that participants in coordination games are able to use salient relational
cues or distinct labels to achieve high rates of successful coordination.
The backstory of the Treaty of Hong Canal presents another interesting feature that might
have influenced the outcome of the negotiations. Chu and Han had collaborated in the revo-
lution against Qin, and they came to control the region through their joint activity of fighting
together against the Qin Dynasty. Was the Treaty of Hong Canal successfully agreed in
part because it was implicitly a bargain struck dividing territories which had been gained by
previous joint activity?
Schelling (1980) explained that people can, and in some cases do, use focal points to
facilitate coordination, because the players recognise that they have a common interests,
and that the focal point cue can serve as an equilibrium selection device. The two players
can reason in a parallel way without any explicit communication about how to coordinate.
Schelling’s intuition has been developed further in a family of theories of team reasoning.
Team reasoning was first proposed by Hodgson (1967) and expanded by Sugden (1993,
1995, 2000, 2005) and Bacharach (1995, 1999). Intuitively, a player is said to engage in
team reasoning if she works out what strategy profile is best for the team as a whole, and
then carries out her component of that strategy profile (Bacharach, 2006).
Bargaining games offer an additional complexity relative to games of pure coordination,
because the two players may have conflicts of interest in who can get the larger surplus. For
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example, the Hong Canal almost surely did not divide the conquered territories into two parts
of equal value. Schelling (1980) argued that tacit bargaining games are essentially the same
as coordination games, and that both players would be better off if they could set aside the
issue of payoff asymmetry in the outcome and focus on coordination. In a game with a salient
focal point cue, if that focal point happened to suggest a lower payoff to a certain player, then
“beggars cannot be choosers about the source of their signal (Schelling, 1980, pp.66)”. Of
course, when the payoff asymmetry suggested by such a focal point is large, the player who
is unfavoured in the suggested outcome might be less inclined to accept Schelling’s argument
of the primacy of coordination, an intuition which has been demonstrated experimentally by
Crawford et al. (2008) and Isoni et al. (2014).
One factor which might encourage the use of team reasoning, even in the face of large
asymmetry in payoffs, is identification with the other player. This could arise because the
two players identify as being part of the same group. Charness et al. (2014), for example,
have shown that an interactive team-building activity can enhance group identity. Bargain-
ing can also be influenced by the origin of the potential surplus to be bargained over (e.g.
Karago¨zog˘lu and Riedl, 2014; Bolton and Karago¨zog˘lu, 2016).
We report a laboratory experiment which leverages the bargaining table design by Isoni
et al. (2014). The bargaining table is a graphical representation of a bargaining situation
between two players. There is a 9×9 grid of squares, with each player having a “base” on
one side. Discs worth various amounts of money are placed at locations on the table; the
players face the problem of how to divide the discs between them. We use layouts of the
discs from Isoni et al.’s design in which a possible efficient division of the discs is suggested
by a cue derived from the physical locations of the discs on the table. Some layouts suggest
a rule of claiming the disc(s) which are closer to one’s own base (the cue of closeness).
Other layouts suggest a rule of claiming discs based on a close visual grouping (the cue of
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accession). Both types of cue indicate divisions of discs which leave an unbroken region of
empty cells in the middle of the bargaining table grid, which echoes the Hong Canal and the
river on the Chinese chessboard.
Our key contribution is to incorporate a prior activity which occurs before bargaining
takes place on the bargaining table. We vary whether this activity is carried out separately by
each participant, or jointly by the two participants who will subsequently engage in bargain-
ing. When the prior activity is joint, we also vary whether the discs on the bargaining table
are presented as having been collected as a result of the prior activity, or whether the prior
activity is unrelated to the bargaining problem.
We find that participants are more likely to coordinate using relational cues in the bar-
gaining game when the discs being bargained over are motivated as being a result of the
prior activity. By comparing the two joint activity treatments against the separate activity
baseline, we conclude that this increased tendency to follow focal points, especially when
payoff allocation are asymmetric, can be attributed mainly to having obtained the discs from
the joint activity and only in part to the fact that participants had a prior interaction; the
linkage between the prior activity and the bargaining problem is also important in increasing
participants tendency to follow focal points.
Compared with existing studies of examining team reasoning and Level-K theories as
an explanation of coordination games (e.g. Bardsley et al., 2010a,b), our design allows for a
robustness check for using team reasoning theory as an explanation for the high coordination
rates often observed in tacit bargaining games. This study also contributes to the literature
examining the effect of induced group identity in strategic games. Many existing studies
induce common identity either by priming natural identity based on gender or country of
origin (Shih et al., 1999; Benjamin et al., 2007), or identity based on existing group identity
as students in the same university or members of the same organization (Attanasi et al.,
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2016). Others use a minimal group paradigm, where groups are generated based on, for
example, one’s stated preference between two works of art (e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971; Yamagishi
and Kiyonari, 2000; Chen and Li, 2009). Our approach is more in the spirit of studies
which use team-building activities to induce common identity (see Eckel and Grossman,
2005; Charness et al., 2014, for example), but in which we can distinguish between the case
in which the team-building has led to a bargaining situation over assets derived from the
previous joint activity, versus the case in which the team-building exercise is separate.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the experimental
design. Section 3.3 presents the main hypotheses. Section 3.4 presents the data and results.
Section 3.5 concludes with a discussion.
3.2 Experimental design
The experiment consisted of 12 different scenarios. For each scenario, participants were
assigned into pairs and they will not be matched with the same participant in two consecutive
periods. Each scenario consisted of two stages. In all treatments, Stage 1 was a task involving
finding a route around 10 points on a map. In Stage 2, the two participants played a tacit
bargaining game. Across treatments we varied the linkage between the Stage 1 and Stage 2
activities, and whether Stage 1 was completed individually or as a pair.
3.2.1 Stage 2: The tacit bargaining game
The Stage 2 bargaining game was implemented using the “bargaining table design” of Isoni
et al. (2014). Figure 3.1 shows two of the tables used in our experiment.
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(a) Game 2; Asymmetric Payoffs; Cue: Closeness;(b) Game 10; Symmetric Payoffs; Cue: Accession;
Figure 3.1: Example of bargaining tables.
The square on the left was coloured red; the square on the right was coloured blue.
In the table, each participant had a base, represented by either a red square or a blue
square. The colour and location of the base for each participant were the same in all scenar-
ios.1 On the table were two, four, or eight discs, worth monetary amounts. Players could
claim as many or as few discs as they wished, by clicking on the discs they wanted to claim.
Players made these claims without knowing the choice of their counterpart. An agreement
occurred if the claims of the two players had no discs in common; in this case, each partic-
ipant would earn an amount equal to the total value of the discs they claimed. However, if
any disc was claimed by both participants there was no agreement: neither participants got
any discs and earned nothing from the scenario. We used a subset of the tables from Isoni
et al.. These tables were designed such that the layout of discs on the table suggested a way
to coordinate the claims to avoid disagreement. Our tables use either one of two relational
cues designed by Isoni et al.:
• Closeness: Discs are positioned so as to be clearly closer to one base or the other,
1The protocol followed Isoni et al. (2014)’s design, to avoid position or colour effects. The location of discs
and bases permutated to ensure subjects see the same table
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Table 3.1: Payoff allocations for all 12 scenarios
Payoff allocations Spatial cuesa. 2 discs 4 discs 8 discs
5 : 5 C G1=5‖5b. G5= 3, 2||2, 3 G9 =2, 1, 1, 1||1, 1, 1, 2
A - G6=(3|2)(2|3)c. G10=(2, 1, 1|1)(1|1, 1, 2)d.
6 : 5 C G2=5‖6 G7=3, 3||2, 3 G11=2, 2, 1, 1||1, 1, 1, 2
A - G8=(3|3)(2|3) G12=(2, 2, 1|1)(1|1, 1, 2)
8 : 3 C G3=3‖8
10 : 1 C G4=1‖10
a. C: closeness; A: accession;
b. “||”denotes the central column that separates the table into two parts;
c. “( )” denotes block of discs;
d. The two bars inside the round brackets indicate the number and value of discs that are placed in the
central column.
suggesting a rule to claim discs which are closer to one’s own base. Game 2 in Figure
3.1 is an example of a game with a closeness cue.
• Accession: Discs are positioned in two groups, suggesting a rule to claim discs which
are in the group which comes closest to one’s own base. Game 10 in Figure 3.1 is an
example of a game with an accession cue.
Table 3.1 summarizes the 12 scenarios we selected from Isoni et al.. The scenarios are
grouped by the most equal payoff allocation possible, which cue is present (closeness or
accession), and how many discs are on the table (2, 4, or 8). We label as symmetric games
the games in which a payoff allocation of £5 to each participant is possible and efficient. In
the remaining games, which we label as asymmetric games, equal and efficient payoffs to
each participant could not be obtained. Symmetric games always have payoff allocation of
5 : 5; payoff allocations for asymmetric games are 6 : 5, 8 : 3 to 10 : 1. In games with 2
discs, closeness and accession are equivalent.
The notation of the games, as shown in Table 3.1, followed Isoni et al.. The two vertical
lines represent the central column in the table that separates the two players’ sides. For
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example, G5: 3, 2||2, 3 means that on the left side of the table there are two discs valued
£3 and £2 and on the right hand side there are another two worth £2 and £3 respectively.
The round brackets represent blocks of discs. For example, G10: (2, 1, 1|1)(1|1, 1, 2) means
that there are two blocks of discs each with four discs valued £2 £1, £1 and £1. Between
the two vertical lines there are two numbers, these represent discs worth £1 that lie in the
central column of the table. The full set of tables we employed can be found in Appendices
B (section 3.6).
3.2.2 Stage 1: The Shortest Route Task
The Stage 1 task involved finding a route which visited 10 points laid out on a two-dimensional
map. We call this the Shortest Route Task (SRT for short). An example of a typical map can
be seen in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: An example of a typical map.
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Participants started from the home location, indicated by the icon of a house, and traveled
around the map collecting boxes, represented by the brown squares. A participant selected
the next box to collect by clicking on it with her mouse. After she clicked on it, a line
connecting the box to the previous location would appear on the map.2 The brown square
turned grey, and an icon representing the collected box appeared on the right side of the
screen. Once the tenth and final box was collected, the route was completed automatically
by returning to the home location. Figure 3.3 shows an example of a completed route with
the shortest total distance.
While moving around the map collecting boxes, the total distance traveled so far was
reported at the left of the screen. After the bargaining in Stage 2 was completed, partici-
pants learned how the total length of their route compared to the routes constructed by other
participants, with a feedback screen as in Figure 3.4.
Participants were encouraged to find a short route in the SRT, and the relative ranking
report could provide some (additional) intrinsic motivation to find a short route. We did
not provide financial incentives based on the SRT, as we did not want to introduce possible
wealth effects to confound the bargaining process.
The SRT is an instance of the traveling salesman problem (hereafter refers to as TSP)
which is a classical combinatoric optimization problem. The game describes a situation in
which a salesman must travel between N cities and return where he starts. There are increas-
ing costs associated with the distance he traveled, so he wants to keep the total distance as
short as possible. The task is typically regard as a “hard” optimization problem, and has in-
trigued mathematicians and computer scientists for decades (e.g. Hoffman and Wolfe, 1985;
Reinelt, 1994; Applegate et al., 2006; Lenstra et al., 2009; Cook, 2012). Psychologists (e.g.
2All distances were represented as if the boxes were on a grid, and travel was only along the up-down and
left-right directions on the grid; that is, all distances used the “taxicab” or “Manhattan” metric. This allowed
us to make all distances exact integers, as well as to be able to draw the paths so a path never overlapped itself.
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Figure 3.3: Shortest route in the sample SRT.
Figure 3.4: An example of the ranking table
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Ormerod and Chronicle, 1999; MacGregor et al., 2000, 2006) have studied the performance
of humans in solving TSPs. The results suggest that in problems of size similar to the ones
we used, humans do a good, but not perfect, job of finding short routes. More importantly,
there is no evidence of significant heterogeneity in skill levels: a participant who finds a
good solution to one instance of the problem is not significantly more likely to find a good
solution to another instance.
We selected the maps for the SRT based on informal piloting with colleagues. In par-
ticular, we chose maps in which the naive heuristic of always moving to the next closet
uncollected box would not yield a good solution. We hinted this to participants by writing in
the instructions:
The route with the shortest total distance is not necessarily the one which always
moves to the next closest box. Instead it may sometimes be useful to select a
more distant box first to set up shorter moves later on.
3.2.3 Treatment design: Connecting the stages
In the Treaty of Hong Canal, the parties needed to decide how to divide gains they had
gained jointly. We are interested in whether bargaining is different when the possible gains
are obtained by joint action. There are two channels through which the joint gains could
have an effect on the bargaining outcome. It could be important that the bargaining is over
those joint gains; or, it might simply be enough that the parties have some prior interaction,
even if that interaction is not linked directly to the gains to be bargained over. We conduct
three treatments to attempt to separate out these explanations.
JE (Joint Endowment)
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Figure 3.5: An example of opened boxes screen in the sample SRT.
In Stage 1, the participants in a pair constructed a path in the SRT by taking turns se-
lecting the next box to visit. One participant was chosen at random to collect the first box;
after that, the other participant chose the second box to collect, and so on, until all 10 boxes
were collected. Each participant was therefore responsible for clicking on 5 of the boxes in
defining the route. Once all 10 boxes were collected, the closed boxes would be opened. It
was explained that some of the boxes contained a disc, and the others were empty. Table 3.5
presents an example of the screen used to display the opened boxes.
In this example, two of the 10 boxes collected in Stage 1 contained a disc, while the rest
were empty. The screen pooled boxes that contained a disc together and those without a disc
together, so there was no way to link any box to any location on the map. After the screen
in Figure 3.5, participants moved to the Stage 2 bargaining table. Here participants saw the
layout of the discs on the table and their values, but with no way to link those discs back to
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the previous screen.
The structure of this treatment presents the discs on the bargaining table as having been
obtained by joint action. Using a combinatoric optimization problem means the quality of
the solution found cannot be allocated meaningfully between the choices of the two players.
While the task is easy to explain, evidence suggests there are not systematic differences in
ability at solving the problem. Therefore, performance on finding a short route should not
suggest a participant deserves a greater or smaller portion of the discs to bargain over. Also,
because the link between the boxes on the map and the tokens on the bargaining table is ob-
fuscated, bargaining cannot be based on which participant happened to “find” certain discs.
We therefore control for entitlement effects, which previous studies have shown can influ-
ence players’ bargaining positions (e.g. Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Price and Sheremeta,
2015; Karago¨zog˘lu and Riedl, 2014).
JA (Joint Activity)
While JE presents the discs on the bargaining table as having been obtained by a joint
activity, it may be that it is the joint activity itself that is important in affecting bargaining
strategies, rather than the link between the bargaining problem and the activity. To control
for this, treatment JA differs from JE only in that no link is made between the Stage 1 and
Stage 2 activities. The linking screen in Figure 3.5 was not used, and instructions were
adjusted accordingly to remove any linkage between Stage 1 and Stage 2; in the experiment,
participants moved directly from Stage 1 to Stage 2.
SA (Seperate Activity)
Because we use bargaining table layouts which appeared in Isoni et al., we can use their
results as one baseline. However, our protocol does differ from theirs, in that our participants
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see fewer tables (12 instead of 24), and alternate the SRT and bargaining table tasks. To
ensure that the SRT itself does not change bargaining behavior, we conducted SA, in which
the two participants complete the SRT individually in Stage 1, before moving on to Stage 2.
As in JA, there is no linkage between the Stage 1 and Stage 2 tasks.
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Centre for Behavioural and Ex-
perimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia. Participants were re-
cruited from the lab’s standing pool of participants, which is managed using the hRoot sys-
tem (Bock et al., 2014). Only participants who had no prior experience in focal point types
of experiment were recruited. All tasks in the experiment were computerized using zTree
(Fischbacher, 2007). We pre-divided the pool of eligible participants into three sub-pools
(JE, JA, and SA) at random and recruited all sessions of a treatment from the corresponding
sub-pool; this ensures there were no selection effects due to the order in which sessions were
conducted. Sessions were run between April 2016 to October 2016. Sessions lasted from 45
minutes to 1 hour.
3.3 Research hypotheses
Team reasoning theory suggests that successful resolution to bargaining problems will be
more likely if the parties are more likely to see themselves as sharing some kind of identity
with their counterpart. In our stylised representation of a conflict like the one between Chu
and Han, this identification can arise through two distinct, but related, channels. The par-
ticipants may be more inclined to engage in team reasoning if they have had some previous
interaction with the counterpart. This may be even more likely if the bargaining situation has
some link with that previous interaction. Both channels are present in the Chu-Han conflict
leading up to the Treaty of Hong Canal; our distinction between JA and JE treatments allows
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us to draw a distinction between the two channels. In contrast, standard game theory makes
no prediction about how any prior interaction would affect the likelihood of an equilibrium
being selected.
Main hypothesis 1 Bargaining will be most efficient in JE, followed by JA, followed by SA.
Higher efficiency will be underpinned by participants following the focal point cues more
often.
It is well established that focal point cues are less effective in the face of conflicting
interests, even when the conflict is small (e.g. Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2014, 2013).
Our interpretation of team reasoning theory suggests that while prior joint activity will make
it more likely that a participant will prioritise the overall outcome of the team, it will not
always overwhelm the tension of conflict in interest, in particular when the difference in
payoffs is large. Therefore we expect to see effects of changing the degree of conflict in
payoff allocations across all our treatments.
Main hypothesis 2 In each treatment, as the payoff allocation suggested by the focal point
cue becomes increasingly unequal, participants are less likely to choose according to the
focal point.
3.4 Results
We report a total of 145 pairs of observations; 49 pairs in treatment JE, 48 in treatment JA
and 48 in treatment SA. Table 3.2,Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 provide breakdowns of the total
claims by participants in scenarios with 2 discs, 4 discs and 8 discs. Participants’ claims
can worth from £0 to £11. In each table, we present numbers of participants claiming discs
worth all possible combination of values. For games in which the claims suggested by the
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focal solution would result in asymmetric payoffs, we distinguish between the claims of
the player who would obtain a higher payoff (the favoured player) and the player who would
obtain a lower payoff (the unfavoured player). We do observe systematic differences between
the patterns of claims between the favoured (Fav) and unfavoured (Unfav) players in these
games. Moreover, weakly dominated strategy (claiming no discs) is rarely been played in 2
discs scenarios (0.6%), 4 discs scenarios (0.4%), and 8 discs scenarios (0.2%). Claiming all
discs on the table (worth £10 or £11) is also rarely played in 2 discs scenarios (0.7%), 4 discs
scenarios (0.6%), and 8 discs scenarios (0.5%).
We next look at the resulting rates of agreement. Table 3.5 reports three measures of
agreement. The first column reports the proportion of pairs whose claims did not conflict,
and therefore resulted in an agreement. The second column specialises this to the case of
efficient agreement, that is, in which each disc was claimed by exactly one player. The final
column reports proportions of pairs in which agreement was obtained, where both players’
claims consisted only of discs among the subset suggested by the focal point.
To measure treatment effects, we conduct logit regressions, reported in Table 3.6, in
which the probability of agreement is determined by the game and the treatment, with stan-
dard errors clustered at the session level. We report specifications in which the dependent
variable is the overall agreement rate, as well as for focal point agreements. We also report
separately estimations using all games, and those using only asymmetric games, as it is in
asymmetric games where team reasoning may mitigate the tension from the asymmetry in
payoffs.
Result 1 There is no significant treatment effect in overall agreement rate. However, agree-
ment consistent with the solution suggested by the focal point is significantly more frequent
in JE than in JA or SA.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of claimed values by treatment in 2 discs games.
Number of participants claiming discs worth
Scenario Treatment Player Mean £0 £1 £2 £3 £4 £5 £6 £7 £8 £9 £10 £11
G1: 5||5 JE £4.95 1 - - - - 97 - - - - 0 -
JA £4.95 1 - - - - 95 - - - - 0 -
SA £5.00 0 - - - - 96 - - - - 0 -
G2: 6||5 JE Fav £5.86 0 - - - - 7 42 - - - - 0
Unfav £5.02 0 - - - - 48 1 - - - - 0
JA Fav £5.79 0 - - - - 10 38 - - - - 0
Unfav £5.15 0 - - - - 41 7 - - - - 0
SA Fav £5.88 0 - - - - 6 42 - - - - 0
Unfav £5.33 0 - - - - 37 10 - - - - 1
G3: 8||3 JE Fav £7.59 0 - - 4 - - - - 45 - - 0
Unfav £4.12 0 - - 38 - - - - 11 - - 0
JA Fav £6.90 1 - - 9 - - - - 38 - - 0
Unfav £4.42 0 - - 35 - - - - 12 - - 1
SA Fav £7.48 0 - - 5 - - - - 43 - - 0
Unfav £4.52 0 - - 34 - - - - 13 - - 1
G4: 10||1 JE Fav £9.84 0 1 - - - - - - - - 47 1
Unfav £4.88 0 28 - - - - - - - - 20 1
JA Fav £9.04 2 3 - - - - - - - - 42 1
Unfav £5.69 1 22 - - - - - - - - 24 1
SA Fav £8.31 1 8 - - - - - - - - 38 1
Unfav £6.81 0 17 - - - - - - - - 31 0
This table presents an overview of all players’ claims in 2 discs scenarios in each treatment. For example, under
claimed value £5 and in the row JE there is a number of 97, meaning that 97 out of 98 participants in JE claimed
£5 in G1= 5||5.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of claimed values by treatment in 4 disc games.
Number of participants claiming discs worth
Scenario Treatment Player Mean £0 £1 £2 £3 £4 £5 £6 £7 £8 £9 £10 £11
G5: 3, 2||2, 3 JE £4.88 1 - 1 5 1 88 0 1 - - 1 -
JA £4.80 1 - 2 7 1 82 2 0 - - 1 -
SA £4.92 0 - 5 2 1 84 2 0 - - 2 -
G6: (3|2)(2|3) JE £4.85 0 - 0 9 0 87 1 1 - - 0 -
JA £4.70 0 - 3 11 0 80 2 0 - - 0 -
SA £4.77 0 - 7 7 0 77 3 0 - - 2 -
G7: 3, 3||2, 3 JE Fav £5.45 1 - 0 6 - 5 36 - 1 0 - 0
Unfav £4.88 0 - 1 3 - 42 3 - 0 0 - 0
JA Fav £5.27 0 - 0 10 - 5 33 - 0 0 - 0
Unfav £4.94 0 - 0 4 - 41 2 - 1 0 - 0
SA Fav £5.54 0 - 1 5 - 3 39 - 0 0 - 0
Unfav £4.81 0 - 1 6 - 37 3 - 1 0 - 0
G8: (3|3)(2|3) JE Fav £5.02 1 - 0 10 - 14 23 - 1 0 - 0
Unfav £4.94 0 - 0 5 - 37 7 - 0 0 - 0
JA Fav £5.00 1 - 0 10 - 12 25 - 0 0 - 0
Unfav £5.02 0 - 0 7 - 29 11 - 0 1 - 0
SA Fav £5.42 0 - 1 4 - 19 22 - 1 0 - 1
Unfav £5.04 0 - 0 5 - 34 8 - 0 1 - 0
This table presents an overview of all players’ claims in 4 discs scenarios in each treatment. For example, under claimed
value £5 and in the row JE there is a number of 88, meaning that 88 out of 98 participants in JE claimed £5 in G5=
3, 2||2, 3.
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Table 3.4: Distribution of claimed values by treatment in 8 disc games.
Number of participants claiming discs worth
Scenario Treatment Player Mean £0 £1 £2 £3 £4 £5 £6 £7 £8 £9 £10 £11
G9: JE £4.89 0 0 0 1 12 83 1 1 0 0 0 -
2, 1, 1, 1|| JA £4.72 0 0 3 5 13 72 1 2 0 0 0 -
1, 1, 1, 2 SA £4.77 1 1 3 2 12 70 5 1 0 0 1 -
G10: JE £4.80 0 0 0 3 14 81 0 0 0 0 0 -
(2, 1, 1|1) JA £4.73 0 0 4 4 10 74 4 0 0 0 0 -
(1|1, 1, 2) SA £4.78 0 0 2 7 9 75 1 1 0 0 1 -
G11: JE Fav £5.59 1 0 0 0 2 15 30 0 0 0 0 1
2, 2, 1, 1|| Unfav £4.88 0 1 0 0 5 40 3 0 0 0 0 0
1, 1, 1, 2 JA Fav £5.48 0 0 1 2 2 11 32 0 0 0 0 0
Unfav £4.83 0 0 0 2 6 39 0 1 0 0 0 0
SA Fav £5.38 0 0 2 3 4 9 27 2 1 0 0 0
Unfav £4.96 0 0 2 1 5 35 3 1 0 0 0 1
G12: JE Fav £5.61 0 0 0 1 5 8 33 2 0 0 0 0
(2, 2, 1|1) Unfav £4.90 0 0 0 1 6 39 3 0 0 0 0 0
(1|1, 1, 2) JA Fav £5.10 0 0 0 6 8 9 25 0 0 0 0 0
Unfav £4.81 0 0 0 4 4 37 3 0 0 0 0 0
SA Fav £5.40 0 0 1 3 5 6 33 0 0 0 0 0
Unfav £5.02 0 0 2 3 2 37 1 1 0 0 0 2
This table presents an overview of all players’ claims in 8 discs scenarios in each treatment. For example, under
claimed value £5 and in the row JE there is a number of 83, meaning that 83 out of 98 participants in JE claimed
£5 in G9= 2, 1, 1, 1||1, 1, 1, 2.
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Table 3.5: Agreement rate, efficient agreement rate and rate of focal point agreements.
Scenario Treatment Agreement Rate Efficient Agreement Rate Focal Point Agreement Rate
G1: 5||5 JE 92% 98% 92%
JA 92% 98% 90%
SA 90% 100% 88%
G2: 6||5 JE 84% 100% 84%
JA 73% 100% 69%
SA 79% 100% 73%
G3: 8||3 JE 73% 100% 71%
JA 63% 97% 58%
SA 77% 100% 69%
G4: 10||1 JE 53% 100% 53%
JA 40% 84% 40%
SA 42% 95% 29%
G5: 3, 2||2, 3 JE 84% 85% 84%
JA 83% 85% 81%
SA 81% 87% 77%
G6: (3|2)(2|3) JE 63% 81% 59%
JA 60% 72% 50%
SA 60% 66% 46%
G7: 3, 3||2, 3 JE 73% 72% 73%
JA 71% 76% 69%
SA 73% 74% 71%
G8: (3|3)(2|3) JE 69% 59% 61%
JA 56% 56% 42%
SA 48% 78% 40%
G9: 2, 1, 1, 1|| JE 86% 79% 86%
JA 75% 83% 73%
SA 65% 71% 65%
G10: (2, 1, 1|1) JE 73% 83% 73%
JA 73% 86% 69%
SA 77% 73% 75%
G11: 2, 2, 1, 1|| JE 80% 51% 78%
JA 73% 69% 71%
SA 71% 53% 67%
G12: (2, 2, 1|1) JE 73% 69% 73%
JA 65% 68% 58%
SA 69% 73% 65%
Note: Agreement rate measures the percentage of pairs whose claims do not conflict; Efficient agreement rate is
percentage of agreement that is efficient. Focal point agreement rate is the percentage of agreements following focal
point. Focal point agreement is defined as both player follow focal point by choosing only discs on his own side (no
matter the number of discs), and not choosing any of the disc on the other player’s side.
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Table 3.6: Logit regression with overall agreement rate and focal point agreement rate (for partic-
ipants as pairs).
VARIABLES Agreement Rate Focal Point
Agreement
Agreement Rate
(Asymmetric)
Focal Point
Agreement
(Asymmetric)
G2: 6||5 -1.019*** -1.059***
-0.313 -0.242
G3: 8||3 -1.426*** -1.500*** -0.408* -0.441*
-0.336 -0.249 -0.245 -0.231
G4: 10||1 -2.537*** -2.564*** -1.522*** -1.509***
-0.347 -0.289 -0.225 -0.21
G5: 3, 2||2, 3 -0.751** -0.734***
-0.346 -0.262
G6: (3|2)(2|3) -1.862*** -2.112***
-0.333 -0.274
G7: 3, 3||2, 3 -1.357*** -1.273*** -0.339 -0.213
-0.308 -0.241 -0.259 -0.245
G8: (3|3)(2|3) -2.006*** -2.280*** -0.990*** -1.224***
-0.312 -0.305 -0.26 -0.268
G9: 2, 1, 1, 1|| -1.214*** -1.096***
-0.335 -0.273
G10: (2, 1, 1|1) -1.251*** -1.204***
-0.306 -0.26
G11: 2, 2, 1, 1|| -1.251*** -1.238*** -0.232 -0.179
-0.326 -0.228 -0.252 -0.243
G12: (2, 2, 1|1) -1.525*** -1.531*** -0.507** -0.472*
-0.311 -0.273 -0.245 -0.252
JE 0.325 0.534** 0.337 0.548**
-0.241 -0.25 -0.233 -0.252
JA -0.0348 0.0247 -0.123 -0.0394
-0.221 -0.298 -0.268 -0.286
Constant 2.230*** 1.994*** 1.240*** 0.954***
-0.309 -0.309 -0.238 -0.267
Observations 1,740 1,740 1,015 1,015
Note: Standard error adjusted for 49 clusters for session. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Independent variables are games and treatments; in games G1: 5||5 is the baseline; in treatments SA is the
baseline. Dependent variables are Agreement rate; Focal point agreement rate; And the last column report
results for asymmetric games only.
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Support. The regression in Table 3.6 shows a positive point estimate for the coefficient on
JE on overall agreement rate for both all games and for asymmetric games only, but the co-
efficient is not significantly different from zero. Looking at the rate of agreements consistent
with the focal point solution, the coefficient on JE is significantly greater than zero. In all
regressions the coefficient on JA is small.
One account of these results is that claims in JE are more predictable and systematic,
in that they are consistent with the solutions suggested by the focal point. The effect on
the overall agreement rate is less, however, because some of the pairs who agree along focal
point lines in JE might have wound up in agreement by chance in JA or SA. This could occur,
for example, if players in JA or SA would play a mixed strategy equilibrium, resulting in
agreement with a positive probability but not with certainty, or if they used reasoning similar
to level-k and happened to submit a pair of claims that did not conflict.
While we observe an increase in focal point agreements in JE, we do not observe the
same in JA. This suggests that the linkage between the Stage 1 and Stage 2 tasks is important.
This is remarkable because the only difference between the two treatments, at the level of
implementation in the experiment, is that JA omits the one screen which “opens” the boxes
and counts out the number of discs. This is a rather light-touch manipulation.
To investigate this in more detail, we drill down to the level of individual players’ claims.
Table 3.7 illustrates that players who are unfavoured by the outcome suggested by the focal
point tend to claim less in total. The size of the asymmetry in suggested payoffs is differ-
ent among 2-disc, 4-disc, and 8-disc games, so we look at each of these groups of games
separately.
Table 3.7 compares, participants’ rate of making claims consistent with the focal point
suggestion across 2 disc games, 4 discs games and 8 discs games for 2-disc games; We report
the results for unfavoed/favored players separately in left/right side of the table.
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Table 3.7: Proportion of participants making claims consistent with focal point suggestions.
Unfav Fav
2 discs
4 discs
8 discs
Note: Left figures report choices of Unfavored players; Right figures repot choices of Favored players.
From top to bottom, we aggregate scenarios with 2 discs, 4 discs and 8 discs. Each sub-figure presents the
proportion of participants who make claims consistent with focal point cues in three treatments.
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Result 2 In all treatments, as payoffs becomes increasingly unequal, players are less will-
ing to follow focal point.
Support. Table 3.8 reports the results of logit regressions, with the dependent variable being
whether a player’s claim was consistent with the focal point suggestion. We report models
using all data; symmetric games only; and asymmetric games, distinguishing the claims of
favoured and unfavoured players. To control for any interaction effects within a session,
robust standard error is clustered at session level (in total there are 49 sessions).
When all games are considered, compared with the baseline G1: 5||5, all other games
have significantly lower rate for participants to choose focal points, given other controlling
factors constant. Claims are significantly more likely to be consistent with the focal point in
JE than in SA.
Considering only symmetric games, relative to the baseline G1: 5||5, players are signif-
icantly less likely to make claims consistent with the focal point in other symmetric games
such as 3, 2||2, 3 and (2, 1, 1|1)(1|1, 1, 2). As the number of discs increase, focal point cues
become less effective.
When payoff allocations suggested by the focal point are unequal, for unfavoured players,
compared with the baseline G2: 6||5, higher inequality between payoffs (G3: 8||3; G4:10||1)
results significantly lower rate of choosing focal point. When payoff allocation is the same at
6 : 5, compared with baseline treatment G2: 6||5, except for G8: (3|3)(2|3), all other games
with the same payoff allocation do not significantly different from the baseline 2 discs game.
For favored player, there is no systematic difference across games. Claims are significantly
more likely to be consistent with the focal point in JE than in SA for both favoured and
unfavoured players.
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Table 3.8: Logit regression results for subjects’ tendency to follow focal points.
VARIABLES Follow focal point Follow focal
point in
symmetric games
Unfavored
players follow
focal point in
asymmetric
games
Favored players
follow focal point
in asymmetric
games
G2: 6||5 -0.386*
-0.233
G3: 8||3 -0.734*** -0.869*** 0.287
-0.232 -0.3 -0.279
G4: 10||1 -1.404*** -2.055*** 0.494
-0.256 -0.285 -0.323
G5: 3, 2||2, 3 -0.734*** -0.733***
-0.262 -0.261
G6: (3|2)(2|3) -2.111*** -2.107***
-0.274 -0.272
G7: 3, 3||2, 3 -0.441* 0 -0.101
-0.235 -0.315 -0.315
G8: (3|3)(2|3) -1.500*** -1.009*** -1.217***
-0.297 -0.339 -0.323
G9: 2, 1, 1, 1|| -1.096*** -1.095***
-0.273 -0.272
G10: (2, 1, 1|1) -1.204*** -1.202***
-0.26 -0.26
G11: 2, 2, 1, 1|| -0.520** -0.226 -0.0511
-0.235 -0.321 -0.347
G12: (2, 2, 1|1) -0.778*** -0.277 -0.489
-0.277 -0.335 -0.324
JE 0.551** 0.505* 0.733*** 0.493**
-0.232 -0.306 -0.264 -0.25
JA 0.0812 0.134 0.1 -0.0186
-0.287 -0.372 -0.28 -0.297
Constant 1.969*** 1.962*** 1.649*** 1.527***
-0.303 -0.326 -0.301 -0.299
Observations 3,480 1,450 2,030 2,030
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Standard error adjusted for 49 clusters for session. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Dependent variable is whether participants follow focal point. Independent variables
are games and treatments; The first column reports results for all games and all subjects; the second column
reports only symmetric games and all subjects; the third column reports only asymmetric games and only
unfavored players; the fourth column reports only asymmetric games and only favored players’ results. If all
games are presented or only symmetric games are presented G1: 5||5 is the baseline for game dummies; if
only asymmetric games are presented G2: 6||5 is the baseline for game dummies. SA is baseline for treatment
dummies.
72
Overall, our finding is consistent with previous literature (for example Isoni et al., 2013)
that as payoff allocations become increasingly unequal, participants’ tendency to follow focal
point will be decreased, especially for unfavored players.
Result 3 In treatments JE and JA, involving jointly solving the SRT before bargaining,
participants report more positive feelings towards the other player.
Support. After all participants finished the last scenario, we asked participants to self-evaluate
to what extent they would identify with the other player as “we” using the “We Scale” mea-
sure (Cialdini et al., 1997). The “We Scale” measure is often used in literature to measure
social closeness. And in our experiments, we use it to measure a generalised feeling of
closeness with other participants in the experiment. Table 3.9 presents the results of ordered
probit regression models with the dependent variable as participant’s self-reported we-scale
value, which ranges from 1 to 7. Explanatory variables include treatment dummies and other
demographic variables obtained from a standard battery of questionnaire questions at the end
of the experiment.
Compared with the baseline treatment SA, participants in JE and JA report significantly
higher “we-scale” identifications. Other demographic variables do not have systematic influ-
ence on the measures. The shift in reports in JE and JA suggest the joint completion of the
SRT was effective in inducing conditions under which team reasoning theory would be more
likely to apply. Our results are in accordance with Charness et al. (2014)’s finding that team-
building exercise (a word formation task) could greatly increase the level of contributions in
public goods game regardless of whether one is linked to people from one’s team-building
exercise. Charness et al. (2014) argue that the reason for such results could be that the pos-
itive feeling engendered by the group exercise spills over to other participants when these
other participants are known to have also participated in a team-building exercise.
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Table 3.9: Ordered Probit Regression results of “We Scale” measures
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES We Scale We Scale We Scale
JE 0.432*** 0.419*** 0.522***
-0.155 -0.158 -0.159
JA 0.589*** 0.575*** 0.474***
-0.163 -0.164 -0.171
Control for demographic variables
Gender No Yes Yes
Age No Yes Yes
Native-English Speaker No Yes Yes
Other controlling variables
University status(Bachelor, Master, Mphil/PhD, Staff) No No Yes
Past participation times in CBESS experiments No No Yes
Observations 287 285 285
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Dependent variable is
participants’ self-reported measure of “we scale” with the other participant. Independent variables of
interests are treatment variables: JE and JA with SA as the baseline treatment; The first column reports
results for treatment variables only; the second column reports the results of treatment variables after
controlling for demographic variables: Gender, Age and whether the participant is a native-English
speaker; the third column in addition controlling for other characteristics of participants as appeared in
the questionnaire, the University Status (Bachelor, Master, Mphil/PhD or Staff) and past participation
times in CBESS experiments (Never, Less than 5 times, 5-10 times,10-20 times and more than 20
times).
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Table 3.10: Ordered Probit regression results for tendency to follow focal point.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES JE JA SA
Standard SRT-Difference (SRTDiff ) -0.166** -0.129*** -0.0346
-0.0655 -0.0415 -0.0441
Num Discs: 4 -0.667*** -0.470*** -0.509***
-0.126 -0.115 -0.0957
Num Discs: 8 -0.591*** -0.375*** -0.542***
-0.127 -0.117 -0.0956
Observations 588 576 1,152
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. In speci-
fication (1) and (2), dependent variable is the rate of choosing focal point for participants
as a pair (the value of the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 2); in specification (3)
the dependent variable is a dummy variable measures whether or not participant choose
according to focal point. (1) specified in JE treatment, (2) for JA treatment, and (3) for
SA treatment. Independent variable of interest is SRTDiff , which is a standardized mea-
sure of participants’ performance in SRT. In JE and JA, participants matched in pairs to
solve for SRT, thus this variable measured the pair’s standardized performance. In SA
treatment, participant solved the SRT individually, SRTDiff measures individual perfor-
mance. “Num Disc” is a category variable measures numbers of discs in the game, the
baseline categories is 2 discs case.
Result 4 Pairs who perform better in the SRT are more likely to choose consistent with
the focal point cue. In contrast, performance on the individual SRT does not predict the
likelihood of focal point choices.
Support. Table 3.10 shows the results of ordered probit regression. For specifications 1
and 2, the independent variable is the number of players in the pair whose claims were
consistent with the focal point cue. For specification 3, the independent variable is whether
each individual player chose consistently with the focal point.
For dependent variables, SRTDiff is the standardized performance in SRT, measured by
the difference between individual pairs’ SRT score and the average SRT scores divided by
standard deviation of all pairs’ scores: SRTDiffi =
SRTi−mean(SRT )
sd(SRT )
.
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The results show that in the individual treatment, SRT task has no significant correlation
with one’s tendency to choose focal point; while in treatments in which the SRT is performed
jointly, better performance in SRT, as measured by lower SRTDiff , is positively correlated
with pairs’ tendency to make claims consistent with the focal point suggestion.
We note again that participants did not find out their relative ranking on the SRT until
after bargaining concluded in a period. Therefore, good feelings arising from a good ranking
could not explain the difference in bargaining behaviour in JE and JA. Because solving out
the SRT is not feasible, we expect that different people will use different heuristics to try
to construct a good solution. If two people with a similar way of looking at a given SRT
meet, then it is likely that, when they alternate moves, the moves each one makes will be
compatible with the plan of their coplayer, and therefore result in a good score. On the other
hand, if two people have substantially different heuristics in mind, the moves of one player
are likely to interfere with the plans of the other, leading to inferior performance. While the
players would not know their final ranking, they would experience whether their coplayer
tended to make moves which they found expected or unexpected, and this could influence
their bargaining decisions in Stage 2.
Such a mechanism would likewise be consistent with team reasoning theory. If two play-
ers find in the SRT that they both appear to conceputalise the solution to the SRT in similar
ways, this might suggest they will likewise have a similar viewpoint in other interactions.
This could then both support an increased likelihood of individuals thinking according to
team reasoning on their own, as well as an increased expectation the other player will do the
same, enhancing the focality of the team reasoning solution.
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3.5 Conclusion
History tells us that the Treaty of Hong Canal set the boundary between Chu and Han using
a geographical reference point. Viewed from the perspective of bargaining theory, one can
wonder whether the fact that agreement was reached, and in particular an agreement using
such a salient focal point, was more likely because the territory being divided was initially
obtained through a joint activity between the two sides.
Because history does not show us alternative what-if scenarios, we construct a bargaining
experiment which reproduces some stylised features of the Chu-Han contention. Players
bargain over valuable objects (disc) laid out on a two-dimensional field (the bargaining table),
with a separating gap (the canal) between them. We vary whether the parties have previous
experience in a joint activity prior to bargaining, and whether that prior activity links to the
bargaining problem by being the source of the discs being bargained over.
We find that both the prior joint activity and the link between that activity and the bar-
gaining problem are required to change claims in the bargaining problem. Claims are indeed
more likely to follow focal point cues in this condition, even, and especially, when the divi-
sion suggested by the focal point is unequal between the parties. In the terms of the story, our
results would say that the fact that the treaty was based on the Hong Canal was more likely
because Chu and Han were dividing up territories they had been able to acquire control over
through their preceding campaigns.
However, we do not find that agreement rates overall are significantly higher, at least for
the scenarios and bargaining rule (simultaneous claims) we consider. Agreements consistent
with the focal point largely “crowd out” agreements that would occur by some other rule, or
perhaps more likely by chance. This would suggest that Chu and Han would perhaps have
been likely to come to some agreement if their dispute had arisen from some other source
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other than their joint campaign, but that the agreement would be less likely to have occurred
using the canal as the border. And, indeed, the treaty was broken the following year by Han,
who eventually triumphed and founded the next dynasty to rule China: the fact the gains
were obtained jointly and the solution along a focal point did not result, in this case, in a
stable long-term agreement.
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3.6 Appendices B
All games in the experiment
Game 1= 5||5 Game 2= 6||5
Cue: C Cue: C
Game 3= 8||3 Game 4= 10||1
Cue: C Cue: C
Game 5= 3, 2||2, 3 Game 6= (3|2)(2|3)
Cue: C Cue: A
79
Game 7= 3, 3||2, 3 Game 8= (3|3)(2|3)
Cue: C Cue: A
Game 9= 2, 1, 1, 1||1, 1, 1, 2 Game 10= (2, 1, 1|1)(1|1, 1, 2)
Cue: C Cue: A
Game 11= 2, 2, 1, 1||1, 1, 1, 2 Game 12= (2, 2, 1|1)(1|1, 1, 2)
Cue: C Cue: A
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Instructions
Treatment JE
Introduction
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you follow the instructions
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will
receive your earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instruc-
tions as they are read aloud.
Everyone in the room is receiving exactly the same instructions.
You will be presented with twelve (12) different scenarios, one after the other. Each
scenario consists of two (2) stages. Everyone in the room will make decisions in the same
12 scenarios. Each scenario is an interaction between two participants. For each scenario,
you will be matched with another participant in the room. Each match is anonymous: You
will never find out with whom you are matched in a scenario. You will not be matched with
the same participant in two consecutive scenarios.
At the end of the experiment, one of the scenarios will be randomly selected to determine
the earnings for the session. Because you will not know which scenario will be selected until
you have made decisions in all of them, you should treat each scenario as if it was the
selected one. So, when thinking about each scenario, remember that it could be the selected
one and think about it in isolation from the others. Your total earnings for the session will be
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given by the earnings from the selected scenario, plus a £5 participation payment.
The scenario
Each scenario consists of 2 stages. At the start of the scenario, you will be matched
with one other participant. You will remain matched with that participant through the whole
scenario, but will be matched with a different participant in the subsequent scenario.
Stage 1
In Stage 1, you and the other participant with whom you are matched will collect ten (10)
boxes. Each box either contains one disc, or is empty. Discs are worth various amounts of
money. In Stage 2 of the scenario, you and the other participant will have the opportunity to
agree on a division of the discs.
These boxes will be placed at 10 different points on a map. Each box is represented
by a square. The locations of the 10 boxes will be different in each scenario. You and
the participant with whom you are matched will start from a home location, which will be
indicated by a picture of a house. The two of you will move around the map collecting the
boxes, and then return to the home location. Here is an example of a typical map.
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The two of you will take turns deciding which box to collect next. When it is your turn,
you will see the message“It is now your turn” at the top of the screen. Click on a brown
square to move and collect the box located there. Each collected box appears as a picture on
the right side of the screen.
After you click to collect a box, it will be the other participant’s turn. Your screen will
display the message“It is now the other participant’s turn to collect a box.” as shown in this
screen:
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As the two of you move around the map collecting boxes, the computer will draw the
path the two of you take. The locations of boxes which have already been collected will be
shown as grey squares; the locations of boxes which still have to be collected will be shown
as brown squares. As there are 10 boxes to be collected, you and the other participant will
each collect 5 boxes.
At the left of the map, the computer will report the total distance travelled by the two of
you. After Stage 2 of the scenario, you will see a ranking listing the total distance the two of
you travelled, and the distances travelled by other participants in the session. The route with
the shortest distance will receive the top rank. You may be able to improve your ranking by
thinking ahead. The route with the shortest total distance is not necessarily the one which
always moves to the next closest box. Instead, it may sometimes be useful to collect a more
distant box first to set up shorter moves later on.
After the two of you have collected all 10 boxes, the boxes will be opened. Some boxes
will be empty, and some will contain a disc.
84
In this example, 3 of the 10 boxes contained a disc, and 7 of the 10 boxes were empty. In
Stage 2, you and the other participant will learn how much each disc is worth, and will have
the opportunity to agree on a division of the discs.
Stage 2
In Stage 2, each scenario is represented by a picture like this on your screen.
85
We will call this picture a table. The discs which the two of you collected together in
Stage 1 of the scenario will be laid out on it. Each disc is labelled with its corresponding
monetary value. In this example, the 3 discs collected in Stage 1 are worth £4, £1, and £2,
respectively.
You and the other participant will be either Red or Blue. The role of Red or Blue will
be randomly decided by the computer. Each of you has a base, represented by a red square
for the Red participant and a blue square for the Blue participant. You will see “YOU” on
your base. Your base will keep the same colour and the same position on the table in all the
scenarios you will encounter.
The basic rules
You and the other participant have the opportunity to agree on a division of the discs.
Each of you separately record which discs you propose to take. We will say that you are
claiming those discs. You can claim as many (or as few) discs as you want. These claims
determine whether there is an agreement or not.
There is an agreement if you have not claimed any of the discs that the other participant
claimed, that is, if you and the other participant claimed different discs. In this case, you get
all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total value of these
discs.
But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other participant, there is no agree-
ment. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing from the scenario.
You can claim a disc by clicking on it with your mouse. If you do this, a coloured line
connecting the disc to your base will appear on the table. If you have claimed a disc but
change your mind and decide you no longer want to claim it, you simply click on it again.
The coloured line connecting it to your base then disappears.
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In each scenario, you can claim as many discs as you like. You should remember that the
other participant will be claiming discs too.
You will not know which discs the other participant has claimed.
When you are happy with the claims you have made in a scenario, you go on to the next
scenario by pressing the CONFIRM button.
Your earnings
When you have finished all 12 scenarios, you will be told which of them was selected
to determine your earnings. The earnings of you and the participant matched with you in
that scenario are determined by the decisions you have made in Stage 2. The Table in that
scenario in Stage 2 will appear on your screen again, and this time you will see both the
claims you made and the claims made by the other participant. You will not be able to
change your claims at this stage.
How much you earn depends on these claims. Remember the rules that determine your
earnings:
• There is an agreement if you have not claimed any of the discs that the other participant
claimed, that is, you and the other participant claimed different discs. In this case, you
get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total
value of these discs.
• But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other participant, there is no
agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing from the scenario.
We will now show some examples of how these rules work.
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Example 1
Suppose the Table in the selected Scenario is the one displayed on the screen, and that
the Red participant’s and the Blue participant’s claims are as shown.
In this case, no disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, and so there is an agreement.
According to this agreement, Blue gets the £4 disc, and Red gets the £2 disc and the £1 disc.
So Blue earns £4 and Red earns £3 from the Scenario.
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Example 2
Suppose instead the claims are as now shown. The £1 disc, which is outlined in yellow
on the screen, has been claimed by both Red and Blue.
In this case, because the £1 disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, there is no
agreement. So neither participant gets any discs, and so they both earn nothing from the
Scenario.
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Example 3
Suppose instead the claims are as now shown. Here, no one has claimed the £1 disc.
In this case, no disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, and so there is an agreement.
According to this agreement, Blue gets the £4 disc and Red gets the £2 disc. No one gets the
£1 disc. So Blue earns £4 and Red earns £2 from the Scenario.
Your total earnings from the experiment will be given by the earnings from the Scenario
selected for payment, as just described, plus a £5 participation payment.
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Treatment JA
Introduction
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you follow the instructions
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will
receive your earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instruc-
tions as they are read aloud.
Everyone in the room is receiving exactly the same instructions.
You will be presented with twelve (12) different scenarios, one after the other. Each
scenario consists of two (2) stages. Everyone in the room will make decisions in the same
12 scenarios. Each scenario is an interaction between two participants. For each scenario,
you will be matched with another participant in the room. Each match is anonymous: You
will never find out with whom you are matched in a scenario. You will not be matched with
the same participant in two consecutive scenarios.
At the end of the experiment, one of the scenarios will be randomly selected to determine
the earnings for the session. Because you will not know which scenario will be selected until
you have made decisions in all of them, you should treat each scenario as if it was the
selected one. So, when thinking about each scenario, remember that it could be the selected
one and think about it in isolation from the others. Your total earnings for the session will be
given by the earnings from the selected scenario, plus a £5 participation payment.
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The scenario
Each scenario consists of 2 stages. At the start of the scenario, you will be matched
with one other participant. You will remain matched with that participant through the whole
scenario, but will be matched with a different participant in the subsequent scenario.
Stage 1
In Stage 1, you and the other participant with whom you are matched will collect ten (10)
boxes. These boxes will be placed at 10 different points on a map. Each box is represented
by a square. The locations of the 10 boxes will be different in each scenario.
You and the participant with whom you are matched will start from a home location,
which will be indicated by a picture of a house. The two of you will move around the map
collecting the boxes, and then return to the home location. Here is an example of a typical
map.
The two of you will take turns deciding which box to collect next. When it is your turn,
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you will see the message“It is now your turn” at the top of the screen. Click on a brown
square to move and collect the box located there. Each collected box appears as a picture on
the right side of the screen.
After you click to collect a box, it will be the other participant’s turn. Your screen will
display the message“It is now the other participant’s turn to collect a box.” as shown in this
screen:
As the two of you move around the map collecting boxes, the computer will draw the
path the two of you take. The locations of boxes which have already been collected will be
shown as grey squares; the locations of boxes which still have to be collected will be shown
as brown squares. As there are 10 boxes to be collected, you and the other participant will
each collect 5 boxes.
At the left of the map, the computer will report the total distance travelled by the two of
you. After Stage 2 of the scenario, you will see a ranking listing the total distance the two of
you travelled, and the distances travelled by other participants in the session. The route with
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the shortest distance will receive the top rank. You may be able to improve your ranking by
thinking ahead. The route with the shortest total distance is not necessarily the one which
always moves to the next closest box. Instead, it may sometimes be useful to collect a more
distant box first to set up shorter moves later on.
When all 10 boxes have been collected, you and the other participant will continue on to
Stage 2.
Stage 2
Stage 2 of each scenario is represented by a picture like this on your screen.
We will call this picture a table. Several discs are laid out on it. Each disc is labelled
with its corresponding monetary value. In this example, the 3 discs collected in Stage 1 are
worth £4, £1, and £2, respectively.
You and the other participant will be either Red or Blue. The role of Red or Blue will
be randomly decided by the computer. Each of you has a base, represented by a red square
for the Red participant and a blue square for the Blue participant. You will see “YOU” on
your base. Your base will keep the same colour and the same position on the table in all the
scenarios you will encounter.
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The basic rules
You and the other participant have the opportunity to agree on a division of the discs.
Each of you separately record which discs you propose to take. We will say that you are
claiming those discs. You can claim as many (or as few) discs as you want. These claims
determine whether there is an agreement or not.
There is an agreement if you have not claimed any of the discs that the other participant
claimed, that is, if you and the other participant claimed different discs. In this case, you get
all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total value of these
discs.
But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other participant, there is no agree-
ment. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing from the scenario.
You can claim a disc by clicking on it with your mouse. If you do this, a coloured line
connecting the disc to your base will appear on the table. If you have claimed a disc but
change your mind and decide you no longer want to claim it, you simply click on it again.
The coloured line connecting it to your base then disappears.
In each scenario, you can claim as many discs as you like. You should remember that the
other participant will be claiming discs too.
You will not know which discs the other participant has claimed.
When you are happy with the claims you have made in a scenario, you go on to the next
scenario by pressing the CONFIRM button.
Your earnings
When you have finished all 12 scenarios, you will be told which of them was selected
to determine your earnings. The earnings of you and the participant matched with you in
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that scenario are determined by the decisions you have made in Stage 2. The Table in that
scenario in Stage 2 will appear on your screen again, and this time you will see both the
claims you made and the claims made by the other participant. You will not be able to
change your claims at this stage.
How much you earn depends on these claims. Remember the rules that determine your
earnings:
• There is an agreement if you have not claimed any of the discs that the other participant
claimed, that is, you and the other participant claimed different discs. In this case, you
get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total
value of these discs.
• But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other participant, there is no
agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing from the scenario.
We will now show some examples of how these rules work.
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Example 1
Suppose the Table in the selected Scenario is the one displayed on the screen, and that
the Red participant’s and the Blue participant’s claims are as shown.
In this case, no disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, and so there is an agreement.
According to this agreement, Blue gets the £4 disc, and Red gets the £2 disc and the £1 disc.
So Blue earns £4 and Red earns £3 from the Scenario.
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Example 2
Suppose instead the claims are as now shown. The £1 disc, which is outlined in yellow
on the screen, has been claimed by both Red and Blue.
In this case, because the £1 disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, there is no
agreement. So neither participant gets any discs, and so they both earn nothing from the
Scenario.
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Example 3
Suppose instead the claims are as now shown. Here, no one has claimed the £1 disc.
In this case, no disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, and so there is an agreement.
According to this agreement, Blue gets the £4 disc and Red gets the £2 disc. No one gets the
£1 disc. So Blue earns £4 and Red earns £2 from the Scenario.
Your total earnings from the experiment will be given by the earnings from the Scenario
selected for payment, as just described, plus a £5 participation payment.
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Treatment SA
Introduction
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you follow the instructions
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will
receive your earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instruc-
tions as they are read aloud.
Everyone in the room is receiving exactly the same instructions.
You will be presented with twelve (12) different scenarios, one after the other. Each
scenario consists of two (2) stages. Everyone in the room will make decisions in the same
12 scenarios. Each scenario is an interaction between two participants. For each scenario,
you will be matched with another participant in the room. Each match is anonymous: You
will never find out with whom you are matched in a scenario. You will not be matched with
the same participant in two consecutive scenarios.
At the end of the experiment, one of the scenarios will be randomly selected to determine
the earnings for the session. Because you will not know which scenario will be selected until
you have made decisions in all of them, you should treat each scenario as if it was the
selected one. So, when thinking about each scenario, remember that it could be the selected
one and think about it in isolation from the others. Your total earnings for the session will be
given by the earnings from the selected scenario, plus a £5 participation payment.
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The scenario
Each scenario consists of 2 stages.
Stage 1
In Stage 1, you will collect ten (10) boxes. These boxes will be placed at 10 different
points on a map. Each box is represented by a square. The locations of the 10 boxes will be
different in each scenario. Here is an example of a typical map.
You will start from a home location, which will be indicated by a picture of a house. You
will move around the map collecting the boxes, and then return to the home location.
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After you click on a brown square to collect a box, the collected box will appear as a
picture on the right side of the screen.
As you move around the map collecting boxes, the computer will draw the path you take.
The locations of boxes which have already been collected will be shown as grey squares; the
locations of boxes which still have to be collected will be shown as brown squares.
At on the left of the map, the computer will report the total distance travelled by you.
After Stage 2 of the scenario, you will see a ranking listing the total distance you travelled,
and the distances travelled by other participants in the session. The route with the shortest
distance will receive the top rank. You may be able to improve your ranking by thinking
ahead. The route with the shortest total distance is not necessarily the one which always
moves to the next closest box. Instead, it may sometimes be useful to collect a more distant
box first to set up shorter moves later on.
When all 10 boxes have been collected, you will continue on to Stage 2.
Stage 2
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At the start of Stage 2, you will be matched with one other participant. You will not be
matched with the same other participant in two consecutive scenarios.
Stage 2 of each scenario is represented by a picture like this on your screen.
We will call this picture a table. Several discs are laid out on it. Each disc is labelled
with its corresponding monetary value. In this example, the 3 discs collected in Stage 1 are
worth £4, £1, and £2, respectively.
You and the other participant will be either Red or Blue. The role of Red or Blue will
be randomly decided by the computer. Each of you has a base, represented by a red square
for the Red participant and a blue square for the Blue participant. You will see “YOU” on
your base. Your base will keep the same colour and the same position on the table in all the
scenarios you will encounter.
The basic rules
You and the other participant have the opportunity to agree on a division of the discs.
Each of you separately record which discs you propose to take. We will say that you are
claiming those discs. You can claim as many (or as few) discs as you want. These claims
determine whether there is an agreement or not.
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There is an agreement if you have not claimed any of the discs that the other participant
claimed, that is, if you and the other participant claimed different discs. In this case, you get
all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total value of these
discs.
But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other participant, there is no agree-
ment. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing from the scenario.
You can claim a disc by clicking on it with your mouse. If you do this, a coloured line
connecting the disc to your base will appear on the table. If you have claimed a disc but
change your mind and decide you no longer want to claim it, you simply click on it again.
The coloured line connecting it to your base then disappears.
In each scenario, you can claim as many discs as you like. You should remember that the
other participant will be claiming discs too.
You will not know which discs the other participant has claimed.
When you are happy with the claims you have made in a scenario, you go on to the next
scenario by pressing the CONFIRM button.
Your earnings
When you have finished all 12 scenarios, you will be told which of them was selected
to determine your earnings. The earnings of you and the participant matched with you in
that scenario are determined by the decisions you have made in Stage 2. The Table in that
scenario in Stage 2 will appear on your screen again, and this time you will see both the
claims you made and the claims made by the other participant. You will not be able to
change your claims at this stage.
How much you earn depends on these claims. Remember the rules that determine your
earnings:
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• There is an agreement if you have not claimed any of the discs that the other participant
claimed, that is, you and the other participant claimed different discs. In this case, you
get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then earn the total
value of these discs.
• But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other participant, there is no
agreement. In this case, you get no discs and so earn nothing from the scenario.
We will now show some examples of how these rules work.
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Example 1
Suppose the Table in the selected Scenario is the one displayed on the screen, and that
the Red participant’s and the Blue participant’s claims are as shown.
In this case, no disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, and so there is an agreement.
According to this agreement, Blue gets the £4 disc, and Red gets the £2 disc and the £1 disc.
So Blue earns £4 and Red earns £3 from the Scenario.
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Example 2
Suppose instead the claims are as now shown. The £1 disc, which is outlined in yellow
on the screen, has been claimed by both Red and Blue.
In this case, because the £1 disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, there is no
agreement. So neither participant gets any discs, and so they both earn nothing from the
Scenario.
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Example 3
Suppose instead the claims are as now shown. Here, no one has claimed the £1 disc.
In this case, no disc has been claimed by both Red and Blue, and so there is an agreement.
According to this agreement, Blue gets the £4 disc and Red gets the £2 disc. No one gets the
£1 disc. So Blue earns £4 and Red earns £2 from the Scenario.
Your total earnings from the experiment will be given by the earnings from the Scenario
selected for payment, as just described, plus a £5 participation payment.
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Chapter 4
Opposites do not attack: War and peace
in a dynamic bargaining experiment with
costly conflict
4.1 Introduction
In this paper, we report results from a dynamic bargaining experiment played in real time.
The bargaining environment combines elements of tacit bargaining (Schelling, 1980; Isoni
et al., 2013) and wars of attrition (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Bulow and Klemperer, 1997).
In our game two players have the opportunity to coordinate, possibly with the assistance of
focal point cues, to share the economic surplus which is continuously realised. However at
any point of time, one or both players can start costly conflict, leading to non-recoverable
costs at both the individual and social levels.
Our experimental design has three essential features:
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1. There is an odd number of indivisible valuable assets that can generate surplus continu-
ously. Players bargain non-cooperatively with regarding to the division of these assets
in each period. There are salient focal point cues in the game to facilitate players’
coordination, while the soft leverage is not binding.
2. If players reach an agreement on the division of the assets, they will share the total
economic surplus in continuous time. Within each single period, equal division of the
assets is impossible.
3. Both players can initiate conflict with regarding to the possession of each of the in-
divisible assets, a situation we will refer to as a war. Wars will turn the assets into
battlefield. Both players incur non-recoverable costs during wars. War can be termi-
nated if either one of the two players exits the conflicting situation. When that happens,
the remaining player starts earning surplus from that asset.
We are interested in studying dynamic bargaining games with the above features because
it could help us understand the determinants of wars (competition) and peace (cooperation).
In the real world, there are many bargaining situations with features as described above.
In the Airline Price War of 1992 (Morrison et al., 1996), oligopolistic coordination broke
down and all companies attempted to defeat others by lowering resale prices; eventually
the whole market suffered substantial losses. During the Chu-Han Contention in 203 BC
in China (Twitchett et al., 1978), two military parties broke the cease fire agreement, the
Treaty of Hong Canal, and started to fight against each other until one capitulated. Finally,
in the recent South China Sea Disputes (Dutton, 2011) several countries broke the peace and
started disputing the ownership of an ambiguous territory among them. In these real-world
situations, timing is important, with both gains and costs incurred and accumulated in real
time. Although there might be various efficient divisions the bargainers could coordinate on,
110
the presence of conflict results in an outcome which is Pareto-inferior.
There is a large literature, both theoretical and experimental, studying the factors influ-
encing cooperation or conflict in bargaining situations. (e.g. Isoni et al., 2013, 2014; Lau
and Mui, 2008; Silby et al., 2015; Cason et al., 2013; Ponsati and Sa´kovics, 1995) We con-
tribute to this literature by studying the dynamics of cooperation and conflict when payoffs
are realised incrementally over time.
Our design not only allows us to capture the results after the repeated interactions, but
also provides a platform to examine interaction effects of personal traits on bargaining out-
comes. Building on existing studies of gender effects (Cadsby et al., 2013; Eagly and Crow-
ley, 1986; Bjo¨rkqvist, 1994; Hyde, 2005) and the influence of one’s Locus of Control (Rotter,
1966) on bargaining (Ryon and Gleason, 2014; Bigoness, 1976, 1978; Ford Jr, 1983; Assor
and O’Quin, 1982; Wall, 1977; Bobbitt, 1967), we look at the effect of these two factors
on players’ bargaining outcomes. We argue that the game can reveal hidden attributes of
bargaining representatives’ interactions that the one-shot game could not capture.
We define cooperative behaviour, where participants do not trespass each other’s assets
in continuous time, as peace; competitive behaviour, where participants have conflict in the
possession of assets for an extended period of time, as war. We report results about war,
peace and their correlation with personal traits. In general, we find participants often engage
in costly wars which results in inefficient outcomes. The presence of possible focal points
does not significantly influence the efficiency of bargaining outcomes. However, it does sub-
tly affect the distributive features of the bargaining outcomes, such as earnings differences
and locations of the conflicts. Participants who find a peaceful accommodation often use
turn-taking strategies to achieve approximately equal and efficient outcomes. Female partic-
ipants are more likely to incur higher conflict costs than male. Pairs in which the participants
have opposite Locus of Control types incur the lowest costs of conflict and therefore result
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in the most efficient bargaining outcomes.
Our findings contribute to the literature of dynamic bargaining games in real time. One
study that can be compared with ours is Luhan et al. (2017), who report results from a
real-time tacit bargaining experiment. Our experiment design differs from Luhan et al. in
that participants can see the other participant’s choices simultaneously on their screen. This
feature in our experiment, we argue, is a more generalised representation of many real-life
repeated bargaining situations. Another study that examines explicit real-time bargaining is
Van Dolder et al. (2015), who use data from a television programme. Bargaining stakes are
discounted 1% per second passed until three participants are able to reach an agreement. In
their game, participants have to accept the unequal distribution and that is their fundamental
conflict of interests; while in our design, having conflict is a subjective choice; and equal and
efficient distribution is attainable by adopting certain types of strategies.
We also contribute to the literature of wars of attrition and locus on control. A war of
attrition is a situation in which two players exert non-recoverable costs in continuous time in
order to claim a reward. Despite its importance in economic theories (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1986; Bulow and Klemperer, 1997) as well as evolutionary biology (Riley, 1980), there
are few experimental studies examining competitive behaviour in wars of attrition (existing
experimental studies include market exit and all-pay auctions Oprea et al., 2013; Ho¨risch
and Kirchkamp, 2007; Krishna and Morgan, 1997), especially from psychological personal
traits aspects. Our result that pairs in which participants have opposite LOC type come into
less conflict is thus worth exploring further. We argue that this finding can be attributed to
the the nature of continuous repeated interaction in the game. The process of which could
give rooms to reveal and react to each other’s preferences and bargaining stances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the game and
relevant theoretical background. Section 4.3 explains experimental design and procedure.
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Section 4.4 presents research hypotheses. Section 4.5 reports the results and Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 The dynamic bargaining environment
4.2.1 The game
Two players, called Player A and Player B, bargain over a set of indivisible assets D =
{1, . . . , D}. At each moment in time, each player i ∈ {A,B} can claim any subset of the
discs. Formally, a claim is an action ai ∈ 2D, where 2D denotes the set of subsets of D.
Players choose one claim for each of a finite number of periods T ≥ 1, numbered t =
1, . . . , T . Claims in period t are made simultaneously. At each period t, both players know
the full history of claims in periods 1, . . . , t − 1. Let Ht denote the set of possible histories
prior to period t, and let H = ∪Tt=1Ht be the set of all histories. A strategy si for player i
specifies an action for each possible history, si : H → 2D.
In our experiment, all assets are identical in terms of payoffs. Let aA and aB denote
the actions of players A and B, respectively, at some period t. Player i receives revenue of
Ve > 0 for each asset claimed by player i but not by player j 6= i, that is, {ai∩aCj }.1 We will
refer to such assets as being possessed by player i. Player i incurs a cost of Vc > 0 for each
asset claimed by both players, that is, {ai ∩ aj}; we will refer to assets in this set as being in
conflict. Any remaining assets, {aCi ∩ aCj }, result in no revenue or cost to either player; we
will refer to assets in this set as being idle.
The overall payoff to each player is determined by the non-discounted revenues received
and costs incurred across all T periods. A given pair of strategies sA and sB generates claims
1The notation SC denotes the complement of a set S.
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atA and a
t
B for all periods t. Let αt = |aA ∩ aCB| be the number of discs possessed by A at
period t and likewise βt = |aB ∩ aCA| be the number of discs possessed by B at period t.
Define γt = |aA ∩ aB| to be the number of discs in conflict at period t. Then the payoff to
player A is
uA(sA, sB) =
T∑
t=1
[αt(sA, sB)Ve − γt(sA, sB)Vc] (4.1)
and the payoff to player B is
uB(sA, sB) =
T∑
t=1
[βt(sA, sB)Ve − γt(sA, sB)Vc] (4.2)
4.2.2 Characterisation of equilibria
Proposition 1. If T = 1, then in any Nash equilibrium, there is no conflict and no idleness,
that is, γ1 = 0 and α1 + β1 = D .
Proof. The argument is by contradiction. Because the game is one-shot, the strategy and
action sets are identical, so we work with actions. Suppose first that an action profile (aA, aB)
is a Nash equilibrium, but there is positive conflict γ1 > 0. Consider an alternate action a′A
for player A, such that a′A = {aA ∩ aCB}. That is, relative to aA, in a′A player A chooses
not to claim assets claimed by player B. Observe that αA(a′A, aB) = αA(aA, aB), while
γ(a′A, aB) = 0. Therefore uA(a
′
A, aB) > uA(aA, aB), generating a contradiction with the
assumption that (aA, aB) forms a Nash equilibrium.
To show that there is no idleness, again, arguing by contradiction, assume an action
profile (aA, aB) with γ(aA, aB) = 0 is a Nash equilibrium, but α(aA, aB) + β(aA, aB) < D.
This implies that the set of idle discs aCA ∩ aCB is nonempty. Consider an alternate action a′′A
for player A, such that a′′A = {aA∪(aCA∩aCB)}. Observe that αA(a′′A, aB) > αA(aA, aB) while
γ(aA, aB) = γ(a
′′
A, aB) = 0. Therefore uA(a
′′
A, aB) > uA(aA, aB), generating a contraction
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with the assumption that (aA, aB) forms a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If T = 1, then any (pure) action profile (aA, aB) with γ(aA, aB) = 0 and
α(aA, aB) + β(aA, aB) = D is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. To prove this, we will show that for all other actions a′A, player A must have lower
utility, that is player A has no incentive to deviate from aA (similar with player B):
uA(aA, aB) > uA(a
′
A, aB) (4.3)
First, in cases where a′A ∩ aCA 6= ∅, i.e. a′A ∩ aB 6= ∅ (∵ aCA = aB). ⇒ γ(a′A, aB) ≡
|a′A ∩ aB| > 0. On the other hand, α(a′A, aB) ≡ |a′A ∩ aCB| = |a′A ∩ aA| 6 |aA| ≡ α(aA, aB);
Both two factors resulting that: uA(a′A, aB) < uA(aA, aB).
Second, in cases where a′CA ∩ aA 6= ∅, i.e. ∃x: x ⊂ aA & x 6⊂ a′A. ⇒ (a′A ∩ aA) ⊂ aA
⇒ (a′A ∩ aCB) ⊂ aA (∵ aCB = aA). By definition: α(a′A, aB) ≡ |a′A ∩ aCB| < |aA| ≡
α(aA, aB). On the other hand, γ(a′A, aB) ≡ |a′A∩aB| > 0 while, γ(aA, aB) = 0. As a result,
uA(a
′
A, aB) < uA(aA, aB), as desired.
Turning now to the case of the repeated game with T > 1, we show that both peace and
war can be sustained in subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3. Let T > 1, and let (sA, sB) be a pair of strategies such that, for each t =
1, . . . , T , αt and βt are constant for all ht ∈ Ht, with αt + βt = D, and γt = 0. Then,
(sA, sB) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In any finitely-repeated game, it is always a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to
play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game at each time t, where the stage-game equilibrium
at time t can depend on t but does not depend on the specific history played up to t.
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Proposition 4. Let T > 1. Then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium with γt > 0 for
all t = 1, . . . , T − 1 along the equilibrium path of play.
Proof. See Appendix 4.7.
Unlike the one-shot game, the repeated game has subgame perfect Nash equilibria both
without conflict and with conflict. This sets our game apart from wars of attrition, as the deci-
sion to engage in costly conflict is endogenous and not imposed in the structure of the game.
This equilibrium selection issue makes this an interesting game to study experimentally.
4.3 Experimental design and procedure
4.3.1 Experimental design
For our experiment, we set T = 100 and D = 9.2 We choose Vc = Ve = 2 pence. Setting the
benefit of ownership of an asset equal to the cost of conflict on that asset simplifies the mental
arithmetic for earnings calculations for the participants.3 Each period lasts approximately
one second, and was referred to as a tick. In real time, therefore, a round of the bargaining
game lasted just over 100 seconds.
Our presentation of the bargaining environment extends the bargaining table design of
Isoni et al.. The assets are represented as discs laid out on a 11× 9 grid. We divide the table
into three distinct zones, as seen in Figure 4.1. Each participant each has a base. The base of
the participant is always on the left, shown in blue, and labeled with the word “YOU.” The
base of the other player is always on the right, and shown in red.4
2We set D as an odd number so that in stage game, equal and efficient outcomes cannot be achieved.
3We were influenced by the results in Chapter 2 of this dissertation in making this choice.
4Therefore, the two participants in a game saw the same bargaining table, but rotated through 180 degrees.
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Figure 4.1: An example of a bargaining table.
The square on the of left zone is in blue, this represents own base; the square on the right zone is in
red, this represents other’s base.
The central column of the table lacks horizontal grid lines. This suggests a division of the
table into three “zones,” one corresponding to each player, and a central zone. We will refer
to the zone closest to the base of Player A as Zone A, the zone closest to the base of Player
B as Zone B, and the central column as Zone C. The nine discs are laid out across the three
zones. We used the three columns shown in the Figure, varying only the vertical location of
discs. Denote the number of discs in Zone A as DA, number of discs in Zone B as DB, and
the number of discs in Zone C as DC . By convention, in all scenarios DA > DB. When
DA > DB we refer to Player A as the favoured player, insofar as the focal cue of closeness
places more discs close to the base of Player A than to the base of Player B.
Our experiment employs a within-treatment design based on two dimensions of the sce-
narios: Imbalance and Central. Imbalance is defined asDA−DB, and captures the degree of
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Table 4.1: All scenarios in the experiment.
Imbalance
Central 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 S(1,0) S(3,0) S(5,0) S(7,0)
1 S(0,1) S(2,1) S(4,1) S(6,1)
2 S(1,2) S(3,2) S(5,2)
3 S(0,3) S(2,3) S(4,3)
4 S(1,4) S(3,4)
5 S(0,5) S(2,5)
6 S(1,6)
7 S(0,7)
All scenarios are represented by two dimensions: Imbalance (I) and Central (C) and
denoted S(I, C). The horizontal axis of the table varies in Imbalance levels and the
vertical axis varies in Central levels. There are 20 scenarios in total.
the asymmetry in the allocation of discs based on the cue of closeness. The existing literature
(see Mehta et al., 1994; Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2013, 2014, for examples) shows
that the power of a cue such as closeness will decline as the asymmetry in the allocations
suggested by the cue becomes increasingly unequal. Central is defined asDC . Discs in Zone
C are equidistant to the participants’ bases, and so closeness does not suggest any allocation
of these discs on its own.
There are 20 possible layouts of the discs that satisfy the constraints that DA ≥ DB > 0
and DA +DB +DC = 9. These scenarios are organised in Table 4.1.
4.3.2 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Centre for Behavioural and Experi-
mental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia. Participants were recruited
from the lab’s standing pool of participants, which is managed using the hRoot system.
(Bock et al., 2014) Sessions were conducted in February and March 2017. There were four
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sessions, each with 24 participants. Sessions lasted from 60 to 75 minutes. Average earn-
ings (including a £9 participation payment fee) were approximately £16. All tasks in the
experiment were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Upon arrival, participants drew a ball from a set of 24 numbered balls to randomize their
seat numbers. In each of participant’s desk, there was a hard copy of instructions and a com-
puter terminal. The instructions were read out loud by an experimenter (same experimenter
for all sessions) and at the same time they appeared on each participant’s screen. In one
screen-shot of the instruction, participants could practice how to claim and cancel claims
using an example. After the instructions, there were 4 practice questions (see Appendices C
in Section 4.7 for details) to ensure participants’ understanding of the instructions.
Participants were matched only once with another 20 participants in the session. Each
scenario lasted around 100 seconds (referred to as ticks in the instructions), and before the
start of one scenario there was an opening screen lasted for 8 seconds (see the screenshot in
Figure 4.2) to facilitate participants’ preparation for the countdown. The other purpose of
the opening screen was to remind participants that they would be matched with a different
participant in each of these scenarios. For each scenario participants were assigned randomly
to the Player A or Player B roles.
119
Figure 4.2: Screenshot of the opening screen
An example of a scenario in progress can be seen in Figure 4.3. As the scenario started,
the timer on the left side of the screen began to count, approximately one tick per second.
Participants could then make claims by clicking on the disc(s) they would like to claim.
When a participant clicked on a previously-unclaimed disc, a blue flag appeared on the disc;
this flag indicated the participant’s own claim. As the other participant also claimed discs,
the other participant’s claims were indicated by red flags on the claimed discs. A claim
on a disc could be canceled at any time by clicking again on the claimed disc. Whenever
either participant made any change to their claims, the screen was updated immediately and
simultaneously for both participants.
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Figure 4.3: Screenshot of a scenario in the experiment.
Numbers of Ticks indicates the time elapsed in the scenario. The left base was coloured blue, and
all discs with flag pointing to the left base were coloured blue; these represented the claims of the
participant. The right base was coloured red, and all discs with flag pointing to the right base were
coloured red; these represented the claims of the other player. The disc with two flags was coloured
yellow, indicating a conflict as both participants claimed it. The earnings summary on the left side of
the screen was outlined by a blue square; the earnings summary on the right side of the screen was
outlined by a red square.
Discs were coloured to indicate ownership status. Blue discs were discs claimed only by
the participant, and therefore the participant earned 2p per tick from each blue disc. Red discs
were discs claimed only by the other participant, the other participant earned 2p per tick from
each red disc. We refer to these discs as being possessed by the participant. Discs claimed
by both participants were coloured yellow. These indicated conflict, and each participant
incurred a cost of 2p per tick from each yellow disc. The cumulative earnings were displayed
in boxes alongside the bargaining table. At the end of the 100th tick, participants saw a
summary screen (Figure 4.4) for around 8 seconds, showing the total earnings from the
scenario for both players.
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Figure 4.4: Screenshot of summary screen for earnings.
The square on the left was outlined in blue, represented own earnings; The square on the right was
outlined red, represented the other participant’s earnings.
Participants played different scenarios, in the same order within a session. The order for
each session was generated randomly by computer. After participants finished all 20 sce-
narios, they answered a standard demographic questionnaire, including questions on gender,
age, school of study, university status and past experience with CBESS experiments. In addi-
tion, they completed an inventory of 13 questions used to assess their locus of control. (See
Appendix C for full details.)
4.4 Research hypotheses
Our predictions focus on four aspects:
1. How often do participants engage in wars?
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2. What are the factors which make wars more likely, and how long or intense are wars?
3. When peaceful outcomes occur, how are they negotiated or sustained?
4. Do the personal attributes (gender and locus of control) of the players predict the out-
comes of bargaining?
4.4.1 War or peace
At each tick, two participants have an opportunity to agree on the division of 9 discs. Discs
claimed simultaneously by both players result in conflict costs incurred by both participants.
We define a situation in which one or more discs are being claimed by both participants as a
war. When such a situation arises, it is analogous to a war of attrition; each participant has
the option of removing their claim on the disc, but if they do so they in effect concede it to
the other participant.
Because in our game there are subgame perfect equilibria both with and without conflict
on the equilibrium path, conflict is not inevitable. This distinguishes our game from war of
attrition experiments (e.g. Oprea et al., 2013; Bilodeau et al., 2004) which impose conflict as
the initial state. An experiment that has a similar feature of voluntary entry is Phillips and
Mason (1997). They examine a repeated duopoly market game where participants choose
quantities to produce with varying fixed costs. They report a high level of competitive be-
haviour of participants entering price wars. Other experimental settings such as all-pay auc-
tions (Ho¨risch and Kirchkamp, 2010; Gelder and Kovenock, 2017), rent-seeking contests
(Mago et al., 2013; Deck and Kimbrough, 2015) and market exit (Oprea et al., 2013), al-
most all report participants tend to engage in conflict to a greater degree than predicted by
equilibrium baselines.5
5See e.g. Kimbrough et al. (2017) for a review.
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The large number of subgame perfect equilibria make this game an interesting one for
an experiment, because it is not a priori clear what equilibrium or equilibria will be selected.
However, based on the results of laboratory experiments on games with conflict aspects, we
predict socially-costly conflict will occur frequently.
Hypothesis 1. Participants will start and persist in pursuing wars.
4.4.2 Focality and Wars
To examine participants’ competitive behaviour, we look at the amount of resources wasted
during fighting. Our prediction of size of war focus on existing focal point cues in the games.
It is now well-established that focal point cues can facilitate participants’ coordination
in bargaining games (Isoni et al., 2013; Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2014). Thus we
predict that the absence of a focal point cue, or the decrease in the power of the focal point
cue, will result in more conflict, as the coordination suggested by the focal point will be less
effective.
As Imbalance increases, the allocation based on focal point cues becomes increasing
unequal, based on existing literatures (Isoni et al., 2013; Crawford et al., 2008; Bardsley
et al., 2010a), the power of focal point cues will be deceased.
Hypothesis 2 The frequency and size of wars will be increasing in Imbalance, ceteris paribus.
As Central increases, the proportion of discs for which the focal point cue does not
suggest an allocation increases. Therefore, the overall power of focal point cues in the bar-
gaining table will be decreased. For example, in the extreme case where Central = D, all of
the discs are located in Zone C, equidistant from both bases, and therefore the discs’ location
does not suggest an allocation.
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Hypothesis 3 The frequency and size of wars will be increasing in Central, ceteris paribus.
4.4.3 Peace
In our experiment, both war and peace are consistent with subgame perfect equilibrium. In
a situation in which participants (tacitly) agree to avoid conflict, the game has similarities
to a coordination game. Based on studies of tacit and explicit bargaining games with the
existence of focal point cues (Mehta et al., 1994; Bardsley et al., 2010a; Isoni et al., 2013,
2014), we predict that participants will tend to claim discs from their own zone but not from
the other participant’s zone; showing an own side effect.
Hypothesis 4 Participants will tend to claim discs in their own zone more often than discs in
the other participant’s zone.
In previous studies, “turn-taking” strategies are found to be used in repeated battle of the
sexes games as a device for mitigating conflict and enhancing coordination (Lau and Mui,
2008, 2012). The intuition under the turn-taking equilibrium is to allow participants to take
turns holding the higher valued assets for an extend periods of time, as a result resolving
the conflict of getting unequal payoffs at any moment in time. Based on existing studies
of repeated coordination games (e.g. Bhaskar, 2000; Mailath and Samuelson, 2006; Lau and
Mui, 2008; Silby et al., 2015; Luhan et al., 2017), we predict that participants will adopt turn-
taking strategy or other coordination devices in order to achieve equal and efficient payoff
allocations.
Hypothesis 5 When the interaction is peaceful, this will be sustained by the use of devices
such as turn-taking, to achieve allocations which are both equal and efficient.
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4.4.4 Individual traits and bargaining behaviour
In Hypotheses 1 to 5, we examined participants’ competitiveness and cooperativeness be-
haviour across scenarios. In this section we examine whether such behaviour is homoge-
neous across individual traits (gender and LOC).
It is found that in most contest games (Cadsby et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2016) or
in non-physical conflict situations (Bjo¨rkqvist, 1994; Hyde, 2005) that females exert higher
efforts than male counterparts. Nevertheless the evidence on competitiveness between gen-
ders is still mixed (See Eagly and Crowley, 1986, for a review of gender and cooperative
behaviours).
Hypothesis 6 Costs of conflict in all scenarios is not significantly different between male and
female.
Locus of control (LOC) is predicted to affect individuals’ attitudes towards bargaining
and conflict. Rotter’s locus of control scale is a widely used psychology concept that speci-
fied one’s perception of causality. An individual with internal locus of control (an “internal”)
perceives himself in control of events affecting him. On the other hand, an individual with
external locus of control (an “external”) believe that events that influence his life are pre-
dominantly determined by chance or other factors beyond his control. Economists have
demonstrated that an individual’s LOC can have a significant influence on his bargaining
stances (e.g. Lefcourt, 1972, 2014; Assor and O’Quin, 1982; Cupach et al., 2009).
Existing studies of individual locus of control and bargaining behaviours (e.g. Bobbitt,
1967; Wall, 1977) have shown that when participants are exposed to a competitive stance,
internals bargain more cooperatively (concede more) than do externals. However, when par-
ticipants encountering a cooperative bargaining stances, internals bargain more competitive
than do externals.
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The reasoning underlying the predictions is that, in competitive situations, internals, who
believe they can significantly influence their outcomes by their own behaviour, will try to
cooperate in an attempt to induce the other participants to cooperate. However, when facing
cooperative bargaining situations, internals will bargain more competitively in an attempt to
exploit (gain higher payoffs than) the other player.
Following the logic above, pairs that are most likely to suffering from war of attritions
(costly conflict) are those where both participants are externals. The logic is that in this ex-
periment, staying in wars incurs substantial costs, therefore participants who have an internal
LOC will make an effort to avoid the conflicting situation in an attempt to increase own earn-
ings and induce the other participant to cooperate. However, participants with external LOC,
who believe their outcomes depend on factors other than own behaviour, will stay inactive
in cases when wars happen.
Hypothesis 7 Pairs in which neither participant has an internal local of control will incur
higher costs of conflict.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Overview
At any time t, each asset can be in one of four states: claimed by both participants; claimed
by participant A only; claimed by participant B only; and claimed by neither participant.
The bargaining outcome is measured based on these four states.
Figure 4.5 shows the proportion of pairs who have no conflict, exactly 1 disc in conflict,
and 2 or more discs in conflict, across all 20 scenarios at each tick. The horizontal axis
presents the number of tick (from first tick to 100th tick), and the vertical axis presents
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proportion of pairs in all scenarios (48 pairs × 20 scenario). Across all ticks, the majority
of observations do not have any discs in conflict. The proportion of pairs who have no discs
in conflict has a spike in the beginning few ticks due to initial claims and conflict resolution,
then has a steady increasing trend until the 50th tick. At the 50th tick, there is a steep decrease
for a very short period of ticks, after which the consistent increasing trend restarts until the
end of the game. The change of proportion in cases of 1 disc almost mirrors that of no discs
but in the opposite direction. We see around 10% of pairs switching from no conflict to 1
disc in conflict at the 50th tick. The proportion of pairs who have 2 or more discs in conflict
is relatively constant, with only a slightly decreasing trend across the 100 ticks.
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Figure 4.5: Average conflict over time
The proportion of pairs that have no conflict, 1 disc in conflict and 2 or more discs in conflict over
100 ticks.
Table 4.2 reports an overview of average participants’ earnings at the end of the 100th
128
tick in each scenario. The table is organized by Imbalance for horizontal axis and Central for
vertical axis. Each sub-figure represents one scenario, and each dot is the final earnings of a
pair of participants (48 dots per scenario). In each sub-figure, horizontal axis represents the
difference in earnings between the participants (piA − piB) and vertical axis represents total
earnings in a pair (piA+piB). The triangle represents the possible outcomes. We present three
outcome measures within a sub-figure. First is the Efficiency Possibility Frontier (EPF), rep-
resented by the top horizontal line of the triangle. The closer a dot is to the EPF, the more
efficient is the pairs’ bargaining outcome. For example, if the total earnings of a pair is
1800p, then the pair would stay on the EPF. Second is the Equality reference line, which is
the dashed vertical line within the triangle. Distances to the Equality reference line measure
earnings difference at the end of 100 ticks. Dots located at the left correspond to higher earn-
ings for participant B; dots located at the right correspond to higher earnings for participant
A. Dots on the reference line correspond to equal earnings. For example, at the intersection
of the EPF and the Equality Reference line are the pairs who get equal and efficient bargain-
ing outcomes (each get £9). Third is the Zero Total Earnings reference line, represented by
the dashed horizontal line within the triangle. Dots below this line correspond to negative
total earnings (piA+piB < 0). For example in scenario S(4, 3), there is a dot laid on the Zero
Total Earnings reference line and intersect with the Equality Reference line, which means
both participants’ earnings were £0, which is equal but (very) inefficient. Overall, in most of
the scenarios, there is a clustering at the intersection of the EPF and the Equality reference
line, showing a preference for equal and efficient outcomes.
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Table 4.2: Earnings distribution of all pairs across scenarios.
Imbalance
0 2 4 6
Central 1 3 5 7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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4.5.2 Competitive behaviour in games
Result 1 Most bargaining pairs incur at least some costs of conflict during the 100 ticks.
Average costs of conflict is 124 across all scenarios, causing significant efficiency loss. This
generally supports Hypothesis 1.
Support (a). Efficient SPE predicts that each disc is claimed by exactly one participants at
each tick, that is the average earnings for all participants should be 900p (£ 9). In our
experiment, participants’ average earnings is 698.8p, showing a substantial efficient loss.
Inefficiency can come from two sources, costs of conflict and idleness. First we look at the
costs. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of overall costs of conflict during 100 ticks. In total
there are 20 × 48 observations, it can be seen that that costs of conflict is a very skewed
to the left (P-value from skewness test<0.00016). The highest 10% costs of observations
have costs ranging from 384 to 1684. In total, 16.6% pairs’ decisions have absolutely no
conflict throughout the 100 ticks. The mean is at 124 (median is 32). The total conflict costs
are measured in two forms: 1) forgone opportunities, as the fruitful assets become unable
to reproduce due to conflict; 2) attrition of resources devoted to war (based on Hirshleifer,
1991). In our experiments, the average total conflict costs are 124 × 3.7 Compared with
total potential gains (1800p), 20.7% of the resources are wasted due to conflict.
Table 4.3 presents the breakdowns of costs of conflict measures in each scenario. We
report three outcome variables: the percentage of pairs that have positive costs of conflict,
average costs and median costs of conflict in each scenario. All scenarios are arranged by
their corresponding Central and Imbalance. In general, we cannot observe any systematic
differences across scenarios.
6Skewness test here implement the test as described by D’agostino et al. with the adjustment made by
Royston
7The total efficiency loss is calculated from adding up forgone opportunity costs (124) and attrition costs
(124 × 2 participants).
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Table 4.3: War rate, Costs of conflict summary across scenarios.
Imbalance
Central 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 87.5% 77.1% 77.1% 87.5%
87.6 100 150 122.6
(14) (12) (24) (31)
1 75% 77.1% 87.5% 89.6%
126.5 130.3 96.8 119.6
(28) (42) (21) (44)
2 81.2% 70.8% 87.5%
142.1 108.7 113.5
(22) (12) (40)
3 83.3% 85.4% 85.4%
104.5 201.7 113.1
(34) (52) (33)
4 87.5% 83.3%
145.1 111.5
(35) (47)
5 87.5% 83.3%
185.6 103.1
(43) (23)
6 87.5%
122
(73)
7 87.5%
102.4
(43)
The percentage number in each cell represents the proportion of pairs who have positive
costs of conflict within 100 ticks. The number under the percentage is the average costs
across all 48 pairs. The number in the parenthesis is the median of costs of conflict across
48 pairs.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of accumulated costs of conflict at the end of the 100th tick.
Support (b). Another source of inefficiency comes from idleness. Our results show that
some discs were unclaimed by both participants for a non-negligible amount of ticks. Some
participants systematically maintained idle discs and had lower costs of conflict than average.
Table 4.7 presents the proportion of idleness in all pairs across all scenarios at each
tick. It can be seen from the table that the first few ticks have high initial idleness and drop
dramatically to a relatively low level, showing participants’ initial claims. After the initial
claims, total idlenesses maintain at a relative low level (around 5%) with a small spike at the
50th tick.
Overall, proportion of idleness constitutes very small percentage of all discs in the table.
Excluding idleness from initial claims, the average proportion of idleness (in total value) in
terms of available assets across 100 ticks is 0.04%. This finding is consistent with previous
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Figure 4.7: Average idleness over time
The proportion of discs as a percentage of all discs (9 discs) that no one claimed (idleness) over the
100 ticks.
studies using the bargaining table (Isoni et al., 2013), in which the situation of a disc going
entirely unclaimed is rare.
In addition, we find that around 2% (21 observations) of all choices have consistently
maintained idleness above 5% (ranging from 5% to 17%) of total assets in 100 ticks.8 We
propose that these pairs maintain consistent idleness to avoid higher costs of conflict. The
average costs of conflict among these pairs (35.0) are much lower than the average of other
pairs (126.3). Earnings difference, on the other hand, do not have large difference.
8We use 5% as a benchmark to examine non-negligible idleness. 5% of total assets can be that idleness of
1 disc for 45 ticks; or idleness of more than 1 discs for less than 45 ticks. The findings are similar is we set the
standard above 5% or slightly below 5%.
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Result 2. The layout of the discs (Central and Imbalance) has little influence on magnitude
of the costs of conflict. These findings reject Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. However the
layout has significant influence on distributive outcomes of the bargaining.
Support. To examine the influence of Central and Imbalance on competitive behaviour, we
first check whether participants’ costs of conflict differ across scenarios. It can be seen from
Table 4.3 that the average costs of conflict do not have consistent correlation with Central or
Imbalance. For a robustness check, we use a panel data regression with random individual
effect, and to control for interactions within a session, robust standard errors are clustered
at session level (see in Appendices C Table 4.10). The results shown that overall, Central
and Imbalance do not have significant influence on costs. While after putting restriction
of Central = 0, Imbalance has a weakly positive significant (at 10%) influence on costs.
Therefore, layout of the discs do not have significant influence on the efficiency of bargaining
outcomes.
However, the layout of the discs has significant impact on the distributive bargaining
outcomes. In specific, conditional on Central > 0, participants are more likely to have
conflict in the central zone (Zone C) than the other zones (Zone A and Zone B); moreover
if Imbalance is high, conflicts are more likely to happen in zone A than zone B (recall that
zone A has more discs than zone B).
Table 4.4 reports the average proportion of conflict in each zone across the 100 ticks. For
example, in the top left cell, (Central = 0 & Imbalance = 1), Zone A has 5 discs and Zone B
has 4 discs. A disc in Zone A is in conflict 5.1% of the time; that is, out of the potential 500
(5 discs× 100 ticks) of conflicts, participants in average have conflict at 5.1% (25.5 ticks)
of the time. It can be seen from the figure that, in scenarios with positive number of discs
in Zone C, a majority of them (12 out of 16) have a higher proportion of conflict in Zone C
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than in Zone A and Zone B. Moreover, when the layout is unbalanced Imbalance > 0, in 11
out of 16 scenarios there are higher proportions of conflict in Zone A than in Zone B.
4.5.3 Cooperative behaviour in games
Result 3. Participants are more likely to claim discs from own zone than from the other
participant’s zone. Favored participants (in asymmetric scenarios) on average claim more
and possess more discs than un-favored participants. These findings are in favor of Hypoth-
esis 4, showing an “own side effect”.
Support. First we look at the proportion of claims for each disc based on its location. Recall
that there are four possible outcomes for each disc at each tick: claimed by Participant A only,
claimed by participant B only, claimed by both, and claimed by none. Figure 4.8 reports the
proportion of the 4 status in each disc in selected scenarios. In each pie, the lightest gray area
represents the proportion of time the disc is claimed by participant A only, i.e. possessed by
A, and the darkest gray area represents the proportion of time the discs is possessed by B.
The two colours in middle represent conflict and idleness respectively (conflict has darker
colour than idleness). Since the proportion of idleness in each individual disc is very small,
thus in most pies, there seems to have only three colours. The allocation of the pies mirror
the allocation of discs in the bargaining table. Figure 4.8 in total presents 8 scenarios where
Central = 0 or Imbalance = 0; the figures from other scenarios can be seen in Appendix C.
It can be seen from Figure 4.8 that, discs in zone A (left side) are more likely to be
possessed by participant A (larger light area), and discs in zone B (right side) are more likely
to be possessed by participant B (larger dark area). Discs in Zone C are most likely to have
relatively equal distribution of the two possession statuses.
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Table 4.4: Average proportion of conflicts in Zone A, Zone B and Zone C by scenario.
Imbalance
Central 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 Zone A 5.10 6.79 8.85 7.11
Zone B 4.65 3.21 6.85 4.73
1 Zone A 6.91 7.55 5.48 7.13
Zone C 14.54 8.40 8.02 7.83
Zone B 5.40 6.47 3.99 2.46
2 Zone A 7.38 5.06 6.23
Zone C 10.28 8.31 7.97
Zone B 7.18 6.49 4.17
3 Zone A 4.37 10.79 5.89
Zone C 8.97 13.10 7.70
Zone B 4.17 9.72 4.58
4 Zone A 6.78 5.45
Zone C 9.23 6.74
Zone B 8.04 7.29
5 Zone A 10.20 5.45
Zone C 11.02 6.46
Zone B 9.32 3.75
6 Zone A 3.83
Zone C 7.95
Zone B 6.12
7 Zone A 6.44
Zone C 5.84
Zone B 4.17
The average proportion of conflict status in each zone across all scenarios.
Scenarios are separated by Imbalance and Central. Each number in the cell
represents the average proportion of status conflict, as compared with idleness
and possession by A/B, in the corresponding zones (Zone A, Zone B or Zone
C).
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of participants’ claims among 9 discs: top row: Imbalance = 0; bottom row:
Central = 0. In each pie: the lightest colour represents possessed by A, darkest colour represents
possessed by B, two colours in middle represent conflict and idleness (conflict darker than idleness).
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In asymmetric scenarios, the number of discs in zone A is always higher than that in zone
B. If participants make their claims following focal point cues, we would observe a higher
number of claims by participant A than participant B.
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Figure 4.9: Average numbers of discs claimed/possessed by participant A/B over time (asym-
metric scenarios).
In Figure 4.9, we present the numbers of discs claimed and owned by favored players
and unfavored players in asymmetric scenarios across the 100 ticks. It can be seen from
the figure than, favoured players consistently have higher numbers of claimed and possessed
discs than that of unfavoured players. The result are consistent with Figure 4.8.
It is noteworthy that the trend of consistent difference in claims and possession does not
exist when the scenarios are symmetric. The graph of average numbers of discs claimed/possessed
by participants overtime in symmetric scenarios can be seen in Figure 4.11 in Appendices
C.
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Figure 4.10: Examples of turn takings in games.
Result 4. Pairs who do not have conflict have the tendency to use turn-taking strategies to
achieve more equal and efficient bargaining outcomes.
Support. Across all scenarios, 16% of all observations have zero costs of conflict throughout
the 100 ticks. Around 9% of the observations have very small cost (Cost = 2). In these
cases, bargainers adopt a cooperation bargaining strategy.
Conditional on participants having no conflict or very few conflicts, we found several
common forms of bargaining strategies as shown in Figure 4.10.
Each sub-figure in Figure 4.10 represents one bargaining pair: vertical axis shows pos-
sessed or conflict value at each tick; horizontal axis shows tick number from 1 to 100. Circle
and diamond dots represent participant A and B’s revenues at each tick. The gray square rep-
resents conflict at each tick. The four sub-figures show 4 representative bargaining pairs that
having a cooperative bargaining strategy. The top-left subfigure represents participants take
turns claiming 5 discs/4 discs for 50 ticks each at no switching costs; the top-right subfigure
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represents participants take turns claiming 5 discs/4 discs for less than (but close to) 50 ticks
each at a few switching costs (conflict value=2 at the 50th tick); the bottom-left subfigure
represents a very sophisticated turn-taking strategy: participants take turns taking 5 discs/4
discs for a multiple number of times; and the bottom-right subfigure represents the non-turn
taking cooperative strategy in which one participant claims 5 discs and the other claims 4
discs throughout the 100 ticks.
To measure the proportion of pairs who adopt turn-taking strategy in the game, we define
the variable TT45 = 1 when two players possesses 5 discs/4 discs for no less than 45 ticks.
This indicates that there are at least 90 ticks the two participants take turns holding 5 discs/4
discs. The results are reported in Table 4.5. The column peace indicates number of pairs who
never have conflict. Among pairs with no conflict, 27 (16.9%) adopt turn-taking strategies.
Table 4.5 also reports numbers of pairs adopting turn-taking strategies for no less than 50,
60, 70 and 80 ticks in total.
4.5.4 Personal traits and bargaining stances
Result 5. Female participants incur higher costs of conflict on average; pairs consisting
of two males incur least costs of conflict.
Support. At each tick, there are 9 discs in potential conflict. The average numbers of disc
in conflict at each tick is 0.63 (sd = 1.46) across all observations (100 ticks × 960) in our
experiment. To examine heterogeneity of bargaining stances across personal traits, we will
list the break down of the average number of discs in conflict by individual and pair types in
the following results.
In our experiment, 92 participants revealed their gender (4 chose the option “Prefer not to
say”) and among the 92 participants 47 are female. Pairs in which there is at least one female
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Table 4.5: Numbers of pairs who adopt turn-taking strategies.
Scenario TT25 TT30 TT35 TT40 TT45 Peace
S(1,0) 18 16 14 11 8 6
S(3,0) 9 9 9 7 4 11
S(5,0) 12 10 8 6 4 11
S(7,0) 12 12 12 8 4 6
S(0,1) 9 9 8 8 5 12
S(2,1) 6 5 4 3 1 11
S(4,1) 15 13 12 11 6 6
S(6,1) 12 12 11 8 7 5
S(1,2) 14 14 11 9 7 9
S(3,2) 10 7 6 5 2 14
S(5,2) 9 6 6 4 2 6
S(0,3) 8 8 8 5 3 8
S(2,3) 10 9 6 6 3 7
S(4,3) 4 3 3 3 2 7
S(1,4) 14 12 10 7 3 6
S(3,4) 7 6 6 4 3 8
S(0,5) 12 11 11 11 6 6
S(2,5) 13 13 13 11 7 8
S(1,6) 10 8 7 5 3 6
S(0,7) 6 6 6 4 2 6
Total 210 189 171 136 82 159
Numbers of pairs that adopt turn-taking strategies in each sce-
nario. TT45 is defined as each participant possesses 4 discs for
at least 45 ticks and possesses 5 discs for at least 45 ticks. Same
standard applies to TT25-40. Peace reports numbers of pairs who
never have conflict.
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Table 4.6: Average numbers of discs in conflict per tick by gender (asymmetric scenarios)
B (unfavoured)
Female Male
A (favoured) Female .625 .705
Male .605 .536
Table 4.7: Average numbers of discs in conflict per tick by gender (symmetric scenarios)
B
Female Male
A Female .787 .686
Male .687 .485
have higher conflict rates, an effect which is more pronounced in symmetric scenarios.
Table 4.6 presents the average numbers of discs in conflict per tick in asymmetric sce-
narios by gender types. If both participants are female, they have in average 0.625 discs in
conflict at each tick; while if both participants are male, they have in average 0.536 discs
in conflict. On average, females have a higher number of discs in conflict than males. The
highest average conflict occurs when female is favoured and male is unfavoured participants
(mean = 0.705); and the lowest conflict occurs when both participants are male.
Table 4.7 presents average numbers of discs in conflict per tick in symmetric scenarios.
It can be seen from the table that, the gender difference follows the same direction as with
Table 4.6, and the difference is more significant. In symmetric scenarios, if both participants
are female, on average they have 0.787 discs in conflict at each tick; if both participants are
male, they have 0.485 discs in conflict. The amount of conflict in mixed-gender pairs falls in
between.
Result 6. Pairs with opposite LOC types (internal and external) have lowest costs of con-
flict which results in significantly higher payoffs than pairs with the same LOC types.
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Support. We define participants with LOC score higher than 6 as having internal LOC, and
participants with LOC score lower than 6 as having external LOC.9 Table 4.8 reports the
average number of discs in conflict per tick by LOC pair types in asymmetric scenarios. The
highest costs of conflict occur if both participants are internal LOC, followed by the cases
where both are externals. Pairs with a combination of internal and external have the lowest
rates of conflict.
Table 4.8: Numbers of discs in conflict by LOC pair types (asymmetric scenarios).
B (unfavoured)
Internal External
A (favoured) Internal .682 .542
External .588 .625
Table 4.9 reports the average numbers of discs in conflict per tick by LOC pair types
in symmetric scenarios. It can be seen from the table that the findings of opposite LOC
types have lower conflict from Table 4.8 is stronger in symmetric scenarios. In symmetric
scenarios, External-External pairs average 1.128 discs in conflict per tick, while Internal-
Internal pairs average 0.718. Both are much higher than the rates observed in mixed-type
pairs (0.307&0.408).
For a robustness check, we used a panel regression with random effect to examine the
influence of pairs’ LOC types on costs of conflict. The results are reported in Appendix
C in Table 4.13. To control for interactions across scenarios, regressions include cluster
random effect at session level. In sum, compared with the baseline pair type Internal-Internal,
External-External, Internal-External and External-Internal have significantly lower costs of
9In our experiment, 21 out of 96 participants have LOC of 6. We omit these participants in this part of
analysis.
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Table 4.9: Numbers of discs in conflict by LOC pair types (symmetric scenarios).
B
Internal External
A Internal .718 .307
External .408 1.128
conflict. The results remain robust after controlling for all other demographic variables,
including: gender, age, University status, field of study, country of origin, and years stay in
UEA.
For a discussion, Results 6 are not consistent with Hypothesis 7. The main difference
of our findings with previous studies is that we found if both players are externals, their
bargaining can become competitive. We propose that, because external players deem external
forces as the major influence of their bargaining outcomes, when they find themselves in a
conflict situation they are more inclined to feel powerless to resolve it, or that it is the other
player’s place to initiate the resolution.
Another possible explanation for our results is the compatibility of bargaining strategies.
Due to the dynamic features of our experiment, participants have sufficient time to know
their counterpart’s bargaining stances. When internals meet externals, the internals are more
likely to adjust their behaviour, and result in an accommodation. As a result, pairs with
opposite LOC types have the most efficient bargaining outcomes.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined individuals’ bargaining stances in a dynamic bargaining game
with costly conflict. We found that some participants systematically enter costly conflict-
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ing situation despite the opportunity to cooperate. Many of the pairs who do not fight use
strategies such as turn-taking to achieve relatively equal and efficient outcomes. The graph-
ical structure of the game does not affect the overall amount of conflict, but it does influ-
ence where conflicts do take place. We found that females are more likely to bargain more
competitively, and bargaining pairs with opposite LOC types have more efficient bargaining
outcomes. Our findings parallel previous results on over-spending in conflict experiments,
and for the influence of focal point cues in shaping outcomes of games.
The most novel result is on the interaction effects of individual characteristics, in par-
ticular in locus of control. The real-time interaction of our experiment gives a richer scope
for players to attempt to come to a mutual accommodation (or not). The compatibility, or
incompatibility, of personal traits can come into play in a dynamic interaction in a way that
is not possible in one-shot, simultaneous-move games.
Games with continuous interaction are underexplored in the experimental literature. Our
results suggest substantial scope for interesting future research. First, tacit communication
or parallel thinking is manifested in our results as shown in various turn-taking strategies and
the switching point at the 50th tick. Though participants cannot communicate directly, many
pairs are able to come to a mutual understanding on how to play the game in a coordinated
way, which is worth exploring in more depth. Second, the compatibility of strategies can be
important in bargaining situations. In common language, it is often said that some people
“bring out the best (or worst)” of other people. The process of adaptability is worth examin-
ing in various strategic interactions. Finally, substantial loss of efficiency is very common in
our experiment, and it will be interesting to explore the underlying reasons for participants’
choice to fight against each other rather than cooperate and share the economic surplus.
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4.7 Appendices C
All scenarios in the experiment
S(0,1) S(0,3) S(0,5)
S(0,7) S(1,0) S(1,2)
S(1,4) S(1,6) S(2,1)
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S(2,3) S(2,5) S(3,0)
S(3,2) S(3,4) S(4,1)
S(4,3) S(5,0) S(5,2)
148
S(6,1) S(7,0)
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose there are D = 9 assets, {d1, . . . , d9}, and two periods, T = 2.
It can be shown that it is possible to have conflict in the SPE. For example: a1A =
{d1, d2, d3, d4, d5} and a1B = {d5, d6, d7, d8, d9} in the first period.
In dynamic games, the claims that are played in T = 2 can depend on the claims that are
played in T = 1. In T = 2 all assets are claimed by exactly one player. To define a SPE, we
specify how play in T = 2 will proceed as a function of the play in T = 1.
• If (a1A, a1B) = ({d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, {d5, d6, d7, d8, d9}), then in T = 2we have (a2A, a2B) =
({d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, {d6, d7, d8, d9}).
• If (a1A, a1B) = ({d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, x) for any set x 6= {d5, d6, d7, d8, d9}, then in T = 2
players follow: (a2A, a
2
B) = (D, ∅) (that is, player A gets all the discs in T = 2).
• If (a1A, a1B) = (y, {d5, d6, d7, d8, d9}) for any set y 6= {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, then in T = 2
players follow: (a2A, a
2
B) = (∅,D) (that is, player B gets all the discs in T = 2)
The intuition is that if a player deviates from the prescribed claims:
(a1A, a
1
B) = ({d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, {d5, d6, d7, d8, d9} (4.4)
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then they are “punished” in T = 2 by playing a (stage-game Nash) equilibrium which is
extremely unfavourable to them.
To verify this is a SPE, we will focus on player A’s payoffs (the argument for player B
is analogous). Suppose player A considers deviating from {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}. Any deviation
from this in period T = 1 leads to a loss of 4Ve in T = 2. Meanwhile, the only deviation
which leads to an increase in earnings at T = 1 is to deviate to {d1, d2, d3, d4}, which
increases earnings by Vc. Because 4Ve > Vc, this deviation leads to a net loss to player A.
Therefore {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5} is a best-response at T = 1.
This argument can be generalised to any number of periods. If there are T periods, we
can support (atA, a
t
B) = ({d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, {d5, d6, d7, d8, d9}) for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1
by using a similar trigger strategy. As soon as either player deviates from this action, play
reverts to the stage-game Nash equilibrium that is most favourable to the other player.
An intuitive (although not exactly precise) explanation of this is: In this sort of SPE,
players must persist in the face of positive confict because, if they ever “blink,” the other
player will respond by claiming all of the assets in all subsequent periods. So, as long as the
earnings in each period are positive, it is better to suffer the conflict, than to deviate, because
a deviation means earnings of zero in all future periods.
A similar argument can also be used to show that SPEs with idleness are possible. The
argument there would again be that if either player deviated and claimed the “idle” disc, the
other player would “retaliate” by claiming all discs in all subsequent periods.
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Instructions
Introduction
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment.
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you follow the instructions
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will
receive your earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instruc-
tions as they are read aloud.
The scenarios
Everyone in the room is receiving exactly the same instructions.
You will be presented with 20 different scenarios, one after the other. Each scenario is
an interaction between You and one Other person.
For each scenario, you will be matched with one other person in this room. You will
never be matched with the same person for more than one scenario. You will never know
who you are matched with.
The real scenarios
Two of these scenarios will be paid for real. By this we mean that:
• At the end of the experiment, we will pick at random two of the 20 scenarios.
• The decisions made by you and the person you were matched with in each of these
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two scenarios will determine how much money you are paid at the end of the session.
You will receive the total of your earnings in these two scenarios.
I have a deck of cards with the numbers one through twenty written on them. At the end of the
session, I will shuffle this deck, and ask two participants to select one card at random from the
deck. The numbers on the selected cards will determine which two of the scenarios will be
paid for real. Because you will not know which scenarios will be paid for real until you have
completed all of them, you should treat each scenario as if it was going to be paid for real.
So, when thinking about each scenario, remember that it could be real and think about it
in isolation from the others.
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An example of a scenario
Each scenario is represented by a picture like the one displayed on the screen. We will
call this picture a table.
Each scenario is an interaction between you and the other person. Each person has a
base. Your base is represented by the blue square and will always be at the left side of
the table. You will see the word “YOU” written on your base. The other person’s base is
represented by the red square and will always be at the right side of the table.
There will be nine (9) discs laid out on the table.
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The basic rules
Each scenario lasts a total of 100 seconds.
You can propose which discs you would like to get by clicking on them. We will say
that you are claiming those discs. Your claims and the other person’s claims are displayed
simultaneously on the screen. Both you and the other person can change your claims at any
time.
On your screen will be a timer, which will count 100 ticks, one tick per second. At
each tick of the clock, the current claims you and the other person are making determine the
money you earn at that tick.
Your earnings are determined by two factors: your revenue and your cost.
At each tick:
• You receive 2p of revenue from each disc which you claim and the other person does
not claim. Likewise, the other person receives 2p of revenue from each disc which
they claim and you do not claim.
• You and the other person incur a cost of 2p each from each disc which both of you
claim. Neither you nor the other person receive any revenue from discs which are
claimed by both of you.
• You do not receive any revenue, nor incur any cost, from a disc that you do not claim.
Your earnings at each tick are determined by your revenue minus your cost. Your total
earnings for the scenario are determined by adding up your earnings for the 100 ticks.
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Claiming discs
We now explain how you claim discs, and how claims are shown on the screen.
Initially, all the discs are white. This indicates that neither you nor the other person have
yet made any claims.
You can claim a disc by clicking on it. Each disc which you are currently claiming is
shown with a blue flag, which indicates your claim. If you change your mind and no longer
want to claim the disc, simply click on it again; this cancels your claim, and the blue flag
will then disappear. Each disc which the other person is currently claiming is shown with a
red flag. If the other person cancels their claim of that disc, the red flag will then disappear.
Your claims and the other person’s claims together determine the colour of the discs and
your earnings.
• If neither you nor the other person claim a given disc, there will be no flags on the disc,
and the disc will be coloured white.
• If you claim a given disc but the other person does not, there will be only a blue flag
on the disc, and the disc will be coloured blue. You receive revenue of 2p from each
disc coloured blue at each tick.
• If the other person claims a given disc but you do not, there will be only a red flag on
the disc, and the disc will be coloured red. The other person receives revenue of 2p
from each disc coloured red at each tick.
• If both you and the other person claim a given disc, there will be both blue and red
flags on the disc, and the disc will be coloured yellow. You and the other person each
incur a cost of 2p each from each disc coloured yellow at each tick.
Your earnings are determined by the number of blue discs and yellow discs. At each tick,
155
you receive revenue of 2p from each disc coloured blue, and you incur a cost of 2p from each
disc coloured yellow.
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Changing your claims
You can change which discs you are claiming at any time. You change your claim on
a disc by clicking on it. If you click on a disc you are currently claiming, you will cancel
your claim, and the blue flag will disappear from the disc. If you click on a disc you are not
currently claiming, you will claim that disc, and a blue flag will appear on the disc.
Likewise, you will know when the other person changes their claim on a disc. If the other
person removes their claim on a disc, the red flag will disappear from that disc. If the other
person claims a disc, the red flag will appear on that disc.
Whenever someone changes their claim on a disc, the colour of that disc will be updated,
as well as the revenues each of you receive and the costs each of you incur.
You can change your claims as many times as you like over the course of the 100 ticks.
You can now practice changing your claims using the table at the left side of this screen.
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Example 1
Suppose at a tick the claims are as now shown on the screen.
The top disc has a blue flag and is coloured blue. The blue flag indicates it is claimed
by you, and the blue disc indicates that you receive revenue of 2p from that disc at this tick.
The bottom disc has a red flag and is coloured red. The red flag indicates it is claimed by
the other person, and the red disc indicates that the other person receives revenue of 2p from
that disc at this tick.
The other seven discs are white. This indicates that they are claimed neither by you nor
by the other person; therefore, neither of you receive revenue or incur costs from any of these
discs at this tick.
Therefore, you would earn 2p at this tick, computed as your revenue of 2p minus your
cost of 0p. The other person would likewise earn 2p at this tick, computed as their revenue
of 2p minus their cost of 0p.
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Example 2
Now suppose at a tick the claims are as now shown on the screen.
The bottom two discs have a blue flag and are coloured blue. The blue flags indicate
these discs are claimed by you, and the blue discs indicate that you receive revenue of 4p
(2p times 2 discs) at this tick. The top disc has a red flag and is coloured red. The red flag
indicates it is claimed by the other person, and the red disc indicates that the other person
receives revenue of 2p from that disc at this tick. The middle disc has both a blue flag and a
red flag, and is coloured yellow. The two flags indicate the disc is being claimed by both you
and the other person. The yellow colour indicates that both you and the other person each
incur a cost of 2p at this tick from this disc. The other five discs are white. This indicates
that they are claimed neither by you nor by the other person; therefore, neither of you receive
revenue or incur costs from any of these discs at this tick.
Therefore, you would earn 2p at this tick, computed as your revenue of 4p minus your
cost of 2p. The other person would earn 0p at this tick, computed as their revenue of 2p
minus their cost of 2p.
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Example 3
Now suppose at a tick the claims are as now shown on the screen.
The top three discs have a blue flag and are coloured blue. The blue flags indicate these
discs are claimed by you, and the blue discs indicate that you receive revenue of 6p (2p times
3 discs) at this tick. The bottom four discs have a red flag and are coloured red. The red flag
indicates these discs are claimed by the other person, and the red discs indicate that the other
person receives revenue of 8p (2p times 4 discs) from those discs at this tick.
The remaining two discs have both a blue flag and a red flag, and are coloured yellow.
The two flags indicate the discs are being claimed both by you and by the other person. The
yellow colour indicates that both you and the other person each incur a cost of 4p (2p times
2 discs) at this tick from these discs.
Therefore, you would earn 2p at this tick, computed as your revenue of 6p minus your
cost of 4p. The other person would earn 4p at this tick, computed as their revenue of 8p
minus their cost of 4p.
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Moving from one scenario to the next
After completing each scenario, your earnings from that scenario will be displayed on
your screen. Once everyone has completed the current scenario and had a chance to review
the results of the scenario, you will be paired with another person, and the next scenario will
begin. Remember you will never be paired with a given person more than one time in the
experiment.
Your earnings
After everyone has finished all 20 scenarios, we will pick at random two of the 20 sce-
narios to be paid for real.
Your total earnings will be the sum of your earnings in these two scenarios plus a 9
participation payment. Your total earnings will be paid to you in cash straight away.
Receiving your earnings will end your participation in the experiment.
Before starting the experiment, we would like you to answer the following questions. Do
not hesitate to raise your hand and seek assistance if anything is unclear.
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Practical questions
Question 1
Now suppose at a tick in Stage 2 the claims are as now shown on the screen.
Part a.
1. How many discs are you claiming?
2. How many discs do you earn revenue from?
3. What is your total revenue (in pence) from these discs?
4. How many discs do you incur loss from ?
5. What is your total cost (in pence) from these discs?
6. What are your total earnings (in pence) at this tick?
Part b.
1. How many discs is the other person claiming?
2. How many discs does the other person earn revenue from?
3. What is the other persons total revenue (in pence) from these discs?
4. How many discs does the other person incur loss from ?
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5. What is the other persons total cost (in pence) from these discs?
6. What are the other persons total earnings (in pence) at this tick?
Question 2
Suppose the claims in Stage 2 are as now shown.
Part a.
1.How many discs are you claiming?
2. How many discs do you earn revenue from?
3. What is your total revenue (in pence) from these discs?
4. How many discs do you incur loss from ?
5. What is your total cost (in pence) from these discs?
6. What are your total earnings (in pence) at this tick?
Part b.
1. How many discs is the other person claiming?
2. How many discs does the other person earn revenue from?
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3. What is the other persons total revenue (in pence) from these discs?
4. How many discs does the other person incur loss from ?
5. What is the other persons total cost (in pence) from these discs?
6. What are the other persons total earnings (in pence) at this tick?
Question 3
The other person will be:
a. A different person in each scenario.
b. The same person in all scenarios.
c. The same person in two different scenarios.
d. The same person in two consecutive scenarios.
Question 4
Your earnings from the experiment will be:
a. The sum of your earnings from all the scenarios.
b. The sum of your earnings from all the scenarios, plus a £5 participation payment.
c. The sum of your earnings from the two real scenarios.
d. The sum of your earnings from the two real scenarios, plus a £5 participation payment.
Oral: Now everyone has finished their practice question, we are about to start the exper-
iment. Are there any questions before we start?... The first scenario will appear on your
screen shortly.
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Locus of Control survey questions
Click on the button next to the one statement that best describes how you feel.
You can always go back to a question and change your answer.
Question 1
 Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck.
 People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
Question 2
 One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don’t take enough
interest in politics.
 There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.
Question 3
 In the long run, people get the respect they deserve in this world.
 Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he
tries.
Question 4
 The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
 Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by acciden-
tal happenings.
Question 5
165
 Without the right breaks, one cannot be an effective leader.
 Capable people who fail to became leaders have not taken advantage of their opportu-
nities.
Question 6
 No matter how hard you try, some people just don’t like you.
 People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get along with others.
Question 7
 I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
 Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a
definite course of action.
Question 8
 In the case of the well prepared student, there is rarely, if ever, such a thing as an unfair
test.
 Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is
really useless.
Question 9
 Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; luck has little or nothing to do with it.
 Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.
Question 10
166
 The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
 This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can
do about it.
Question 11
 When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
 It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter
of luck anyway.
Question 12
 In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
 Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.
Question 13
 What happens to me is my own doing.
 Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life is taking.
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Additional data analysis
Results 2: Competitive behaviour and focality
Table 4.10: Panel data regression on determinants of costs of conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Costs|C = 0 Earnings|C = 0 Costs|I = 0 Earnings|I = 0
Imbalance 7.496* -12.04*
(4.433) (7.277)
Int-Ext -21.38 50.36 -123.3 220.2*
(25.87) (40.20) (77.85) (123.6)
Ext-Int -16.49 -1.956 -121.1 168.1
(29.25) (49.16) (75.11) (115.9)
Int-Int 1.161 -2.691 -81.03 124.4
(30.99) (46.79) (59.03) (90.36)
Central 0.0481 1.452
(4.564) (5.823)
Constant 92.93*** 750.8*** 218.2*** 547.4***
(26.55) (42.12) (65.39) (97.02)
Observations 384 384 384 384
Number of SubjectID 96 96 96 96
R-squared overall 0.00783 0.00908 0.0304 0.0300
R-squared between 0.0123 0.0142 0.0750 0.0975
R-squared within 0.0170 0.0204 0.0158 0.0123
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Results 3: Cooperate behaviour in games
Average numbers of discs claimed/possessed by participants overtime in symmetric scenarios:
3
4
4.5
5
6
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er 
of 
dis
cs
0 25 50 75 100
Tick
 A claimed  A possessed
 B claimed  B possessed
Figure 4.11: Average numbers of discs claimed/possessed by participant A/B over time
(symmetric scenarios).
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Proportion of 4 status of claims in other scenarios:
Figure 4.12: Proportion of 4 status of claims in each disc: Imbalance = 1.
Figure 4.13: Proportion of 4 status of claims in each disc: Imbalance = 2.
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Figure 4.14: Proportion of 4 status of claims in each disc: Imbalance = 3.
Figure 4.15: Proportion of 4 status of claims in each disc: Imbalance = 4.
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Figure 4.16: Proportion of 4 status of claims in each disc: Imbalance = 5/6.
Result 6: LOC and bargaining stances:
Average numbers of discs possessed by Participants by LOC types:
Table 4.11: Numbers of discs possessed by Participant A by LOC pair types. (asymmetric
scenarios).
B (unfavoured)
Internal External
A (favoured) Internal 4.205 4.350
External 4.173 4.264
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Table 4.12: Numbers of discs possessed by Participant A by LOC pair types (symmetric
scenarios).
B
Internal External
A Internal 4.227 4.326
External 4.021 4.096
Robustness check for the effect of LOC on costs of conflict:
It can be seen from Table 4.13 that Pairs with opposite LOC types (Int-Ext and Ext-Int)
have significantly lower costs (conditional or unconditional) than that of same LOC types
(Ext-Ext), ceteris paribus. The results remain robust after controlling for other demographic
variable (specification 4-6). As a result of lowers costs of conflict with opposite LOC types,
earnings of Int-Ext is significantly higher than Ext-Ext.
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Table 4.13: Random effect Panel data regressions examine LOC types.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Cost(UnCon) Cost(Con) Earnings Cost(UnCon) Cost(Con) Earnings
Imbalance -1.921 -2.171 2.719 -1.872 -2.137 2.660
(2.191) (4.058) (3.664) (2.177) (4.062) (3.659)
Int-Ext -33.51* -41.48** 69.49*** -37.99* -47.51** 77.77***
(19.39) (19.60) (22.57) (20.24) (20.63) (22.56)
Ext-Int -33.74** -45.55** 35.81 -34.09** -45.79*** 37.37
(16.68) (18.62) (28.56) (15.96) (17.45) (26.13)
Int-Int -8.898 -17.62 14.10 -13.06 -22.11 22.02
(20.58) (19.19) (30.21) (21.96) (20.66) (28.22)
Male -12.32 -8.900 16.09
(20.32) (20.43) (16.97)
Age 16.86** 15.82* -17.20
(8.370) (9.464) (12.85)
University status 6.630 7.501** -6.057
(4.162) (3.282) (5.802)
Econ 36.59 32.08 -32.87
(32.02) (29.48) (26.61)
Year -13.09 -9.471 14.44
(14.00) (15.57) (17.78)
Brit -6.775 -6.132 19.24*
(13.44) (16.10) (10.80)
Constant 148.3*** 178.1*** 663.8*** -158.9 -121.8 958.3***
(10.58) (11.00) (15.36) (138.9) (152.8) (215.8)
Observations 1,920 1,609 1,920 1,900 1,593 1,900
Number of SubjectID 96 96 96 95 95 95
R-squared overall 0.00499 0.00579 0.00541 0.0203 0.0204 0.0122
R-squared between 0.0111 0.00955 0.0280 0.0920 0.0782 0.102
R-squared within 0.00410 0.00490 0.00407 0.00400 0.00486 0.00390
Robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To control for interactions within a session,
robust standard errors are clustered at session level. Independent variable: Pair types by LOC; we define External
as participants with LOC > 7; “Int-Ext”: A is internal, B is external; “Ext-Int”: A is external, B is internal; “Int-
Int”: both participants are internals; “Ext-Ext” is the baseline group where both are externals. University status
measures whether participants are bachelor, master, Mphil/PhD or Staff. Dependent variable: “Cost(Uncon)” is the
unconditional costs of conflict; “Cost(Con)” is the conditional costs of conflict conditional on Cost > 0; “Earnings”
measure the final payoff.
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